Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 42f6bc1cf31c23d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB
MD5: 033ba155f85431c184aedd9696755393 SHA-1: 76cdb73adc5c18e1e1b805846b925e8686bdd100 SHA-256: 42f6bc1cf31c23d05458552ab93abd7e3d2df66740f39da32dbae39200bce450
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF file that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when a specially crafted PDF is opened. The PDF contains an XFA form with executable script, which is likely responsible for triggering the exploit. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit's nature suggests a downloader or initial access mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
102c5a4c58ad9472798ccfc45b9f3771ede1ab65f2e381f8e3e3640ff420c2a9		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 80345 bytes

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