Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 42f2626005f1e359

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.68 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 7aa4fac2b7a21eccefdfa59df1c8a572 SHA-1: e29faa1301e1d00a31e4462bbafe91a1be66df0c SHA-256: 42f2626005f1e359d33861b55b62681f52274e02283279fcc3e54be3ee52ffa3

176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic T1071.001 Web Protocols T1204 User Execution

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download and execute a remote payload from https://link.takusuki.com/wfJqTF. It also contains an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings, including JavaScript and indicators related to CVE-2023-26369, suggesting a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.

URL https://link.takusuki.com/wfJqTF
TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED

PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`stream_014_off0003f52b.bin` `b0a7e7055d5b66edffe76c7b1f32ec80318d696df6181f1536f27aa69517872f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3F52B	566620 bytes
`stream_015_off0006f1fe.bin` `0d5715bfb4def94d644e408c5ed714ea2ac557b061d036e7fdcf0a2bf1c990e2`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6F1FE	398152 bytes
`font_02_sfnt_off000882ce.bin` `ff37b045be3591e8cfbfa76f5dec51bee78deccafa1dc391d1edb36502c7f815`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x882CE	346068 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off000b0600.pdf` `57845d3a47de3253cdf32a0bffe3b556edaa2b9f681b6fb6095c00e29fbdf051`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xB0600	1036800 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off000db600.pdf` `1e4622f6388ffdc623d50dfe52650c5954ed679074cfa915b5bb0ff04b4cba8b`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xDB600	860672 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.