PDF malware analysis — malicious · 42ee2581182161fd

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.6 KB Created: 2010-08-29 16:19:36 Authoring application: styeZek colSnap

MD5: 39b5849269410544ba9f51fdf2cbb269 SHA-1: c4d072f9d5b883272cc1896ccc949ca1d031de69 SHA-256: 42ee2581182161fd19ff25239c6d57d9bbaa604a07ab82a27da17d5b0f87a8be

166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded executable scripts, as indicated by the PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD and PDF_XFA_SCRIPT heuristics. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. The embedded script is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, a common technique for PDF-based malware.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT

PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x207	84 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0009.bin` `24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x2B8	228 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `1e42ebab18d9bf6d09f7c87789ab53ecfceb9e19814594da19219609c12be372`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x3AB	1323 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x6D2	199 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `e49bcba1575661459e18335b7e0de85694f86ee02555bafc40e52e0e4dd6625e`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7C4	33931 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0013.bin` `e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x41CA	77 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x4271	56 bytes

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