Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 42ed5eac4c0b76dc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

115.7 KB Created: 2005-06-29 18:14:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 10.0
MD5: fd1f2833a6060843ab5793b2282d2057 SHA-1: 94f99345f81880ab14158385d8d157479e253dfc SHA-256: 42ed5eac4c0b76dc5822dccaf0809a5255feb85e0efeedd8f58cabbfeab73a95
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The OLE document exhibits anomalies, including a large slack region and an appended executable-looking payload, strongly suggesting malicious intent. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of an embedded URL and the overall structure indicate a likely attempt to deliver a secondary payload or exploit. The exact nature of the attack is unclear without script analysis, but the heuristics point to a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 118,431 bytes but its declared streams total only 20,632 bytes — 97,799 bytes (83%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.