Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 42a95bdf62751a42…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.5 KB Created: 2021-09-17 07:08:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: e89ba67beb57965a3a4a19f1f42cd72a SHA-1: 1cd89b0325f26d3119f2f23d890f7923322d55b1 SHA-256: 42a95bdf62751a42f179c308f79dcbc168098ae4aafeead0077f79b1fd8ac963
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, many of which point to potentially compromised or disposable hosting. The heuristic 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' indicates the document attempts to trick the user into installing a browser extension or update, which is a common social-engineering tactic. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to deliver a secondary payload or phish for credentials.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://irpuyesh.com/cache/fck_files/file/ganufokokodufu.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://baohanhranghm.com/upload/img/files/panabawugalibixino.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.firstpages.eu/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/88894127213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uetty.xyz/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vusewifimozadojowub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://strongpointmarketing.net/userfiles/file/wisopopaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ziguratex.com/helpdesk/app/webroot/img/userfiles/files/kabisipazijodoxidel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stw-nowogard.pl/download/file/73635782683.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://samsungklima.net/upload/ckfinder/files/tedifuvav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://averon.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161403af0d347f---74258050255.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://salonlomi.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161409b50e91ed---29907787107.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dom-nenilovo.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/98cc4bb9060ba753619bf5d93c5176a7/3356808630.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bainihu.com/upfiles/editor/files/69452308380.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartickgroup.com/userfiles/30488586354.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://premiersuli.hu/files/files/fidosinak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://synphabase.ch/upload/file/fegamojiposi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://farmaciafasolis.eu/userfiles/files/wepipoge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://konferencii.org/web/uploads/assets/file/jobumegem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rehahomecare.com/upload/editor/files/podizabose.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agsposure.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2c6de9dfe5f967b8589bcea5d5b72e53/texowetewut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://apexnepaltravel.com/userfiles/file/fakewam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.c2commercial.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7433284225efe9ea3ea3baf8190eee77/67705430281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://graciaindoutama.com/kingkong/userfiles/files/weredefegobevovujerofu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ergakiland.ru/files/files/kubogogimibisode.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chongthamnguoc.vn/img/files/45774019458.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=transfer+files+from+android+to+chromebookPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d8e1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD8E1 18020 bytes
SHA-256: 5cb884ec51a39d091eaeabd51ecb638b5883989e06ab505edea74bbbec14808f
font_01_sfnt_off000106ff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x106FF 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011f16.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11F16 10936 bytes
SHA-256: cc2419d59635e26a71c2531a74ecc2b19cd8290e5d9220f77959db2b8df09790

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