Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4283f2d870a93bc6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

22.2 KB First seen: 2022-11-09
MD5: 518e843ea28ff8c51ffb521b6a0c76ed SHA-1: 85e8622318a4fefca243e9e3a4fb656ecc7a70ed SHA-256: 4283f2d870a93bc66a29f07b48743280ba8aca4a0251d1829a2e3a2080921182
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, which is a known exploit vector. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, triggering the exploit. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of malicious code. The exploit likely leads to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000046d0.bin
b51455c1fa512371a7760d61a5b0f1ac053edc3be50abaa48c1937fbb028e5e8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x46D0 1281 bytes