Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 427e0f8a31223cf2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

12.4 KB
MD5: 2343fed9e0f45ed07abe28aad83c2644 SHA-1: f0485acbc2ce18e8c01af52de3c36bf11a0e2db4 SHA-256: 427e0f8a31223cf26abd099764a231b1fe007c6b3907ddadc922f8031d21689e
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known flaw in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening. No document body text or scripts were provided, so the specific payload or further actions are unknown.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e53.bin
cbc45d63bc018a54690d8fb0e987fa63b6eb6e81ff3369e7a173cea7e72c9114
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E53 1577 bytes