Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Heuristics 10

• Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
  An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
• Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
  Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
• Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
• PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
  PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
• ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
• ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
  ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
• Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
  PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
• VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
  Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com

  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

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