Malware Insights
The file is an RTF document containing a malicious OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document also employs social engineering to trick the user into enabling content. The primary attack vector is likely the exploitation of the Equation Editor to achieve code execution, leading to the download and execution of a further stage.
Heuristics 6
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Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATEDRTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
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Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITORRTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00000b51.bin6b81275ca3387eef22060979f1050db62cde2e7bdc473c6107efcc603130cc50 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xB51 | 1635 bytes |
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