Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 42470aa131fa6fe1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

340.8 KB
MD5: 205145c02bb408faff7b5230ec588914 SHA-1: 55f83b9634b72174d61d2b75646b40ea506eda4a SHA-256: 42470aa131fa6fe1faa44f6f9ad7dc39a90b125213c6b0b9c29132cfcf9f82d1
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to automatically activate and execute embedded content upon opening, a common lure to bypass security measures and deliver a malicious payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document likely instructs the user to enable content. No scripts were extracted, and no document body was available for analysis.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
eedfb89d8eea05c6dfa5573725f3a28d50f5cee9b7f1089b3446ac5f1d37924d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 75553 bytes
objdata_01_off00026fe4.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x26FE4 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00028587.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x28587 12297 bytes