Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4241eaed87d010b8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: 531e0d8b1654d78065cf32296fa68b18 SHA-1: 3fb3158a1031897b6b737f35c3f01dcb36c173c7 SHA-256: 4241eaed87d010b8c0f092c93f820200a89be0b2e3974a1b814488783e811eb8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. The presence of ".objupdate" and the specific ProgID "EQUATIoN.3" strongly indicate exploitation of this known Microsoft Office Equation Editor flaw.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a3.bin
ae8d4a71f5df93e484469212464d39ca3c7a9ba74e7ccd6da2d77064b88bf06d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA3 1997 bytes