Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 422c1f6167830882…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.6 KB Created: 2020-08-01 16:10:35 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 67da51a2544b60d0f9cce1afba5bae30 SHA-1: f053b60edcb56f8f66d967c526bf0aa3b7175147 SHA-256: 422c1f61678308820bc68509e5f42783b26d9fcfeb589d62dbe4338deb6e47a0
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'ttraff.ru'. Additionally, it exhibits a PDF link farm heuristic, with many links hosted on Shopify, including one to 'kazusabomepivemeribubore.pdf'. The document body also contains instructions that suggest a 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE', indicating the user is prompted to copy and paste content, likely to execute commands or visit malicious sites. The primary intent appears to be directing the user to malicious infrastructure via these links.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=webpack+copy+files+to+dist
    • http://files.holisticparentingnetwork.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739916/2843000.pdf
    • http://files.oddenilssen.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379991/febidujudote.pdf
    • http://files.joshuabenkingfineart.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814716/1988122.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3287/1074/files/kazusabomepivemeribubore.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/77650869017.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8806/0321/files/rupasulibarawufaxowuke.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6331/1512/files/78671451806.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0879/4525/files/zorejew.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6055/2085/files/62911157293.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2181/1364/files/6076038136.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7564/1247/files/tasojadafir.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4433/8838/files/90311493149.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3309/9430/files/pipati.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4466/7553/files/99350397318.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006171.bin
71ffebd804dc8f56be89625c455aeb498a9ad65c15e11d1048ea93718a590076
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6171 5372 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000073e8.bin
87f7f78832c668a0340448a858ac933ad07662f3bf1e7deebab5a4135ec7ac00
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73E8 14524 bytes