Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 422476723c3c3d26…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-11-01 19:09:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 61361976aa3105f3303d5cfa6cf0d17d SHA-1: 9d2e3c8c26249e5d8b6531fe973d9ac82ee0ef50 SHA-256: 422476723c3c3d261a6d20cb933fdf90415e048e7f6fe151862e4b0ea4c53fe4
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and ultimately redirect to a known malicious URL. This indicates a link farm or SEO poisoning attack designed to drive traffic to malicious infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=microbiology+with+diseases+by+taxonomy+bauman In PDF document text
    • https://jarapitoxedomel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437170/55cd9e8865.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://walutosewog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312240/a3db9f41b0d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pudijubo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134311311/fac4a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keziripar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134522929/2529053.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://penopetidurip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815040/4fd5055892d8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://buximinolid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381316/tuwofoxuzuritel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365598/normal_5f86f49455479.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://talowitutujuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999148/linavutebenetafos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7ba2376e-c797-4b53-8827-85dad2b45caa/chinese_scooters_haynes_manual_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/681fa084-e06a-4e85-8d3d-733d924d05cf/47473234898.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fikuvine/savinikokuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/3525/7753/files/jomifemekotikejudin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1fe2ab9c-7924-4bd4-8d23-d75bcbc79f7e/lakudoletowovifojelu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fasanag/86304412080.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005dbd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5DBD 5760 bytes
SHA-256: 474826768b463305a5761f0d9e49b30ab70438c9295dee00e27d0e412bdbc2bf
font_01_sfnt_off0000714e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x714E 10832 bytes
SHA-256: d013287d8f1ba2c23abec00f31bbac68fa7273b263cb5c870676a9a21a1d7fc4