Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 41edae2922d65240…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.0 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 0ca2ba9f6a1a8da84c22e8a30c678301 SHA-1: 870edfc70e4048c60c94a9fc7d5a1fb940b6ebac SHA-256: 41edae2922d65240ef0533920cb67a9dcab2a58384b5d588c89edfc4c40a7b5d
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of CreateObject calls suggests the macro attempts to interact with the system or download additional content. ClamAV identified this as a downloader, indicating its primary purpose is to fetch and execute further malicious code. The extracted artifacts 'macros.bas' and 'vbaProject_00.bin' are direct indicators of the malicious macro content.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
62bcf9fc59ce61dd3c49f3ab6ac8462d1331f3f88fef9bb86b4aefbb161eb187
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2282 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
4fabb043d4f31e0825f60c43ecf92c79d1c4595a1c9925f60e44bbfacd5e9615
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 99328 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.