Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 41b97a05eb100230…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

307.3 KB
MD5: 6722b3b0ecae04f6abfeb720e1e55d1f SHA-1: 9357a1c4250384fc25c84c0e49c8f61011aef923 SHA-256: 41b97a05eb10023008ea24154634e2207166f0bdef18d11c86279470e23ce888
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with high-confidence firings indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to automatically execute embedded content upon opening, likely to bypass user interaction for macro execution. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document instructs the user to enable content. The primary attack pattern involves leveraging OLE object vulnerabilities or features to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
1a404d6cbac75fb4584b60244d09d1528613a8b712d92f13435ec990070052fc		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 59037 bytes
objdata_01_off0001e9b6.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E9B6 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0001ff59.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FF59 12297 bytes

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