Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4155ab16d7e328bd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

615.9 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 4aac24ced91f1286780513342c7da8fc SHA-1: f051857b9518be98862beec4f82e47060e7a8771 SHA-256: 4155ab16d7e328bd6253b0f66dbcc43c27dfa2c71538cfac906dcf3c3e0a650a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the activation of OLE objects, leading to arbitrary code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics strongly indicates this exploit vector. The embedded URL, while benign, is part of the document structure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000907a2.bin
96ca334a30642cf7338e650319354da186ae5bc2555d5fdea772654e20a2efd6		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x907A2 3732 bytes

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