Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4148050e2978b456…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.76 MB
MD5: b53f6c42f93cb5ea1f088d2c82257147 SHA-1: e2199bc893deebac3a7ff604887b967664285022 SHA-256: 4148050e2978b456d0c22c7c5f3ac3ac1c3660968f4cef13a52878c1ac6b8853
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to the Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a critical vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882, which is known to be exploited for remote code execution. The excessive hex data within the OLE object likely hides the delivered payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1849KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003e.bin
e84e6f17295958e30f5b25e90c8605e4d9a6022ade3588b63f6879ec8b655114
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E 924563 bytes