Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4113f63ca37cce16…

MALICIOUS

PDF

313.6 KB Created: 2008-02-14 17:33:19 -03:00 Authoring application: Acrobat Editor 8.0 (via Adobe Acrobat 8.1.0)
MD5: 0f480ffc1f9040399432f578aba97db4 SHA-1: d588aaeb910b0e437f3237a66a774c91454a183b SHA-256: 4113f63ca37cce169a96bcf7282fc1f93ed968c91a13171ce4a3bcc86872256d
306 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

This PDF file contains multiple high-severity heuristics indicating malicious intent, including the exploitation of CVE-2009-0927 and the presence of an encrypted JavaScript payload. The file also contains an embedded PDF, which itself has suspicious findings. The combination of these factors strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit vulnerabilities and download further malicious content.

Heuristics 12

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • CCITTFaxDecode + active content — LibTIFF CVE-family indicator high CVE related PDF_CCITT_CVE_2010_0188_RELATED
    PDF uses /CCITTFaxDecode together with JavaScript, XFA, or RichMedia indicators. This matches the delivery pattern for Adobe Reader LibTIFF/CCITTFax parser exploit families, including CVE-2010-0188, but does not prove the exact malformed TIFF primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators medium PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 216 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_003_off00002125.bin
63bbb2d19297ca0cd7b0f903ae45c881d68c58630880431144fcac6837733a17		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2125 4096 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018462.pdf
fd930d64a6f5493a718674e1767285ac9d09b7f327728c0919488278cfcbea15		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x18462 221656 bytes

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