Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4110c0bc0b095650…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.17 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-21
MD5: 2aa12f820dbd28fba7666795b67be95a SHA-1: c5be397677469e1801bb767294d7cf73b3bec48d SHA-256: 4110c0bc0b095650727f4a425912f8eb9e25c1576a7ad2a2b853289cecabb1c0
314 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has suspicious findings including direct links to executable payloads and external URIs. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, indicating the primary malicious functionality is within the OLE object and the embedded PDF.

Heuristics 10

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • https://mobile.mail.yahoo.com/apps/affiliateRouter?brandUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fparg.co/UZzB&appName=YMailNorrin&partner=2&locale=1&pageId=&clickRef=contact_card&region=na&annotation=&buckets=

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
ed8742e4fa206be741b24d9f706379084523342928c2fc0861184c37d7e804ae
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0000F0BA/ole10naTiVE 1363 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
0d24c07cfb22f05bb6acf33ee8dd4c3a2fc1195a3691de245d3b88f1aa2b97c7
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1218048 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
220b09b8140b31f1279452267a3eb9fa24c2e91a5b48fd6af3d878bafc147735
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1197056 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e400.pdf
bc97ae1e3ddb0ee32134b1c0cf77219b9cff7d330c432d29adc05563e324147c
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE400 1164288 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001dc00.pdf
14f7f5e7f47d00fd38736f343aac1079f45a61ba9a26fb165d576ec56a22ad9c
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1DC00 1100800 bytes