Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 41091160b220ada9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

520.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-10
MD5: 7053c94741144c3c28a1a684692d4e8c SHA-1: 86333786ea1423b7c01614b94871fba2e785c10a SHA-256: 41091160b220ada943aef9668147c36a8578c78741f4b6e49574b62873c59d9e
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The critical heuristic firing confirms the presence of the Ole10Native payload associated with this CVE. No VBA macros were found to contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit is directly within the OLE object.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
21e680096cae085fecf6d6d4142226d03d2af6d38317b07af3126d8c1ae5fa4a
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD021B12BD/OlE10NAtIVE 1447 bytes