Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4104b9c4eaf970aa…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.3 KB Created: 2020-08-29 10:52:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8785f73cfb2f6a04fd352f0a501af71b SHA-1: 6e0a0e98590c910a8edf6a1d230ef046cf1a543f SHA-256: 4104b9c4eaf970aa011c4405968284796426b6c1352772bf9915849532eab893
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a mass external link farm, with one primary link pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body text and embedded URLs suggest a lure for downloading 'Aegisub karaoke effect', which is likely a pretext to redirect the user to malicious infrastructure. The PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK and PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristics confirm the malicious nature of the embedded links.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=aegisub+karaoke+effect+download
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7704/2337/files/samebemo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8376/7713/files/nojajedowololug.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0462/6808/8469/files/vubasarotep.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6012/5080/files/35424890495.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6397/5835/files/baredufu.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_a644aabf54cd4891aee24555feb8c015.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_1df76c52905049e4a7f838e2a31f28a2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f69721c1e91e4e1899830ade4b079143.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_db728c2d8e534cf69190d2e03b2c1a4e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_eceaa00d0e2d4ebd8888d8e36a723509.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e19b1b304b08440b8938ddfcc4b87809.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f602e6d0c98f4ab48961cb3c154c89d3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9cf5d56a661243fba9817a90c2b050e1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_7c7dd89e9dab43968eb089672b0031c8.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e1392cf124544ada8d2b309ecddaf9ff.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_bf8204b084274036b0933a571710e5af.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006ebe.bin
904908d28e6f0eb79edb83de2d6316bcee8f590e916f5203cee29a6b886090fa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EBE 5472 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000817a.bin
046a159e41e9dcc0f6587f1322b86f58128420335f8bbd61af3b3b9ce16ea84c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817A 10392 bytes