Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 40aec87d3b5f5e9e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.9 KB Created: 2020-10-28 09:30:37 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: a106ace0fb4a88810316c55488088776 SHA-1: aa76ec663d225f7275b7f6a5537e581f7b584f26 SHA-256: 40aec87d3b5f5e9e3de821886d420498a6f888981281f4364ac121bc877e2299
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with several pointing to known malicious redirectors and disposable hosting. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body itself is heavily obfuscated and contains a URL, suggesting an attempt to redirect the user to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=kamen+rider+cosplay+decade In PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/logape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pesajupamobe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607203/1164057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://porelananov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775759/6676615.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://titawijuneve.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012454/4f456bcf1e1b4d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xujaxivef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438557/8988457.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuxozajuje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379873/kinufijozulof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuvofexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163751/7d2665a5e7dd46.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizumoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681494/9274324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mogezisatizate.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775403/267015cb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sisodiwitamusoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681746/69830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/8990/6849/files/poetic_mode_documentary.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8307/1650/files/87945171806.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/memul/razapunupezus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wizidimawag/40080077971.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wiwamoxamo/xizogoxoki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/89155342682.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c0a013e9-66cd-494e-bd0a-8976414b22f6/wegetapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/930d4690-3cf6-4059-950e-25ae71ad2e50/zaxikexokawazumidadimep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004d17.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4D17 5288 bytes
SHA-256: a2c42c8ce822009187b36fe1e01534a10d5b736a0240f9a055763c5145e1cc1f
font_01_sfnt_off00005efe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5EFE 10392 bytes
SHA-256: 234558c2772c297d451df8cbd4e49ff170c2738d91d5613ab246cee17affda7d