Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4096904ba365ba21…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: fea980728566f8317eac5e83f4a39b6c SHA-1: 9c0d2a2ef7e436c483cd5888771e2ed148791d37 SHA-256: 4096904ba365ba217e813f788cc9e62c87037e946fd3c035b5e66d6b758f2a5e
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The presence of \objupdate directives indicates that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities to download and run further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d0.bin
32668dff7b6f2b151c4240c7b7d0ed539e3ad33769eb34fa164bbb857f01e894
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD0 1702 bytes