Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4091c384505e96e6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.0 KB Created: 2021-05-26 16:40:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: 6d8e0c8926dcd5afc39217f13b37e72d SHA-1: 79c4c9f8056beab0b4c3f35db2da13690dc832db SHA-256: 4091c384505e96e6d06e2d6d68a0ac49fc54e2c76907a71abef8d79da6661576
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious sites. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with techniques used to deliver second-stage payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gimoguvi.ru/strik?utm_term=deed+of+sale+motor+vehicle+word+format PDF link annotation
    • https://mebedepubini.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813558/2458990.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://senorori.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134641151/joroguxugowatud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365628/normal_5fd60f7dd6c47.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4496165/normal_5ff2cd835bb2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://finedogu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134749629/698c20e08a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://waseralubireg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134622629/tibegazaxenem_xigiguxo_wolubabizutisun_vapezigurivujer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4424646/normal_6069ff625beec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dagaroxir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135973008/98981.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368740/normal_6061a89eee392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xugubevowasisof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885616/juduguririsalakuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fupakukenig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234610/lobukarizevupup_pawimevatawu_ruwemodipuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e86712e0-dcc5-4552-88ec-e8ae02feef73/vivuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8188c92f-c664-4a20-b9be-adbe244edcdd/the_fall_guy_intro_1982.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9535fbcb-5706-4c5f-9158-36106c9c789e/64723085370.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d555c129-8aba-4e5c-b10f-08d946c69fd3/how_to_use_countable_and_uncountable_nouns.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0a63cef1-1e34-41a1-9b74-cf02c0bc44d1/kibuwinaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ebd6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEBD6 5412 bytes
SHA-256: f56f1decaa39d988bd2e0a5aff651cc1541d7a1d3bdf5f5477c32c7eff4ce9f6
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe34.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE34 10620 bytes
SHA-256: 94b694d528370988cdf18532165bd3b92db941deae7def465508a197174f3195