Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 407a90cecaede971…

MALICIOUS

RTF

201.8 KB First seen: 2023-07-13
MD5: b645601ba4798362e867d97b9d4e60ff SHA-1: 4c648231f3137161bc07f340ce374fcb8640e427 SHA-256: 407a90cecaede9714e782434ca4378badddb6c77df3a5d2a6a78869c23dfb8bd
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor exploit, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, suggesting a malicious payload is intended to run upon opening the document. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b39.bin
b7a0ef10711db1b425537a0e50a306e90cbe9e0729e769f2b38bc3b20f495040
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B39 62176 bytes