Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 40669d38c3e1fa95…

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.0 KB Created: 2020-07-28 14:11:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c3b2166afb5ff7798bf4a9cbc0a6c9f5 SHA-1: 28854210c552a479606d1cb0e0fc50d42f25c3d7 SHA-256: 40669d38c3e1fa9598f92b162a6212eb77e6a2674df1ba50ce81dcf8a86ac93c
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external resources. One critical heuristic indicates that these links lead to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of the 'wkhtmltopdf' application name suggests it might be a generated document. The primary attack pattern involves a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=java+collections+questions+and+answers
    • http://files.dreampartiesnl.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070450/4345313.pdf
    • http://files.suncom.us/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437225/nusiti.pdf
    • http://files.everythingdamask.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814459/30e63c3be224aba.pdf
    • http://files.awakeningsprayer.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775441/supurojinonune.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/1407/6069/files/linalunulejeke.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8709/4179/files/77761541739.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/94448736580.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7193/8461/files/18433745780.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0553/2569/files/79214877640.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/5103/0430/files/8457274251.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5528/3350/files/57705574369.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2009/0517/files/webiwudokori.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/3901/2502/files/27597868581.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6983/2354/files/78212720564.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1625/5650/files/wedonugivopavi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ad9f.bin
82c379ef3e39abb9719ff5c9ac4cd29529d4f7f30978d9e13cd6e9849ce6572b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAD9F 5084 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000befa.bin
07592dcc91fd765586493471e6e9183381f24afea046ed91eb036931ad7c9d10		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBEFA 10484 bytes

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