Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 404f0f676d94ffdc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

88.9 KB First seen: 2023-08-22
MD5: 5292d77a5796360358f012d31f4cd438 SHA-1: ceb7009b833a4829f9017636445a07ca201a9db4 SHA-256: 404f0f676d94ffdc3cc0b4422a34a5aee31d06c815253ba0e7aeb0fed3905b9c
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically leveraging the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body provides a lure related to financial auditing to encourage users to enable editing, which would likely trigger the OLE object's execution. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically or upon user interaction after enabling editing.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003e0c.bin
2be14a94f9624d27baef7dae45deb30b65f01f0f756e37bbe36feb9d8f3ae431
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E0C 1271 bytes