Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 404ee1403df9f2b2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

16.8 KB
MD5: 8d195db00cc6bf08965bc91f2879149c SHA-1: b68a5aa8a9e59c36d2884705c7b9159a15dcce23 SHA-256: 404ee1403df9f2b2e989a8c935e8bdf18c2406d383a0f0801d7ce44b3c6e1515
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor. High-confidence heuristics indicate the activation of Equation Editor with a critical firing for CVE-2017-11882. This strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit this known vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001ad1.bin
6920c53b50847dd978c739c64ba921c3369ed80a4f4e9c3def8181a377a2aef5		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AD1 1721 bytes

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