Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 404ac3772a5cb4f4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

81.9 KB First seen: 2024-07-05
MD5: 80c1a351670e6b6d65b35ab23b0f70e2 SHA-1: ab3f6f47347247add8cff5b97a51b2d6e0c8748c SHA-256: 404ac3772a5cb4f4ffadf5f0e7eb8ce9486e90017c8f85c846ddd31f429bb0bd
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates that this document is designed to exploit this vulnerability. This exploit likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary malicious payload, characteristic of a downloader or initial access stage.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000134a.bin
d7cca2ee8755b4bc93a9d9268fbaf72d15ee280e1d3379fb5b57b0aeaa983757
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x134A 1517 bytes