Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 403f6970042106e0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.3 KB Created: 2020-08-30 21:03:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f2d70bbea8b41429e0f5728f5905bca9 SHA-1: 3bc3c6e0e34be05e7e7a313b592ceb6dc2f7111a SHA-256: 403f6970042106e044fa4e25c6fb5f6b12b20cc4068eed1d7b4706d23a3090b8
130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded links, one of which points to a known malicious redirector. The document body text, though partially corrupted, suggests a lure related to an 'SBI bank draft form', aligning with the 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic. The presence of a mass external PDF link farm further indicates malicious intent to distribute content or redirect users.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=sbi+bank+draft+form+pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9d1f4062f4564fcf9ee63f59a0a84290.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/26481d_dedf1279510443e6aee194cb55cb1b61.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b85eb0_c776157e17674d5d8ab581e742674094.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1f2646_80f474a5b56a42d8a90dc135dbaa0203.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e4ff69_a7be2d1d45c842c09c32e88d22962204.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_157440d2edae43d6b7bdffdd7c5d561d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5ecadc_b8983508d4c4490a844a3f09e3d70781.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8acad3_8668f3de0b22403bb533b6c71de780a1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_15a7d94fea334c708ab20de89bbd90e2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/353d00_2423c46889ff4e8faf3fc94113b82586.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_469bdc7996e2437d98cc89df968115a4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_8fb9c67ba5c34197bdd12f7c1116f610.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_62efa845e940446e88105a7eda97732d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/430cb2_4603410c4b7c4374b0f6a9a1a6d9d643.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_59fa1813d14a48b384a6d51b8831d1e2.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000060aa.bin
47f6710faa47d4a2489945c60e0296b4076ce5418166fa4fd802f79d04438e0a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x60AA 5284 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007284.bin
69d1fc9af5e1cf19d0342864d4f7925f27ec7d8b9fc2cd68b27896702b98a563		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7284 10016 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.