Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4004426b9ad86dd2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

21.4 KB Created: 2017-12-14 13:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-04-14
MD5: 7196bc4e12f5c0115e395928ff0baa24 SHA-1: fa9bd87062c0534830610bf755f7c94e45745478 SHA-256: 4004426b9ad86dd2651e963d16a7025fd24a4d22965626941389591a59df396b
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an OOXML document that leverages CVE-2017-0199 to load an external OLE object. This object points to the URL https://docria.github.io@littleurls.com/evqrW, which is highly suspicious and likely serves as a loader for a secondary malicious payload. The heuristic firings directly indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 and the presence of an external OLE object, confirming the attack vector.

Heuristics 3

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://docria.github.io@littleurls.com/evqrW
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
c3d4c5dfe019e61c614b81733887bf8fd99cb8f2410d9a04904661c77c0a64e7
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 49184 bytes