RTF malware analysis — malicious · 3feebd74bb896e9f

MALICIOUS

RTF

23.7 KB First seen: 2022-11-22

MD5: ca6c9df2bbbd5ef23175f4348863be27 SHA-1: 1c770a71475a568669678f072b7cb998e92ff67a SHA-256: 3feebd74bb896e9f95d690680c1eaae0afd36a171dab3da4e979fa9ce313af1e

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating an attempt to exploit the Microsoft Equation Editor vulnerability. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms that the document instructs the user to enable editing, a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The embedded OLE object is the likely vector for the exploit execution.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000482e.bin` `eb632bb6ede95cf400ce45a82776d8130ce39d403f55470f07536e7f13444410`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x482E	1256 bytes

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