MALICIOUS
402
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample is an RTF document that leverages multiple OLE object vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-0199/CVE-2017-8759. These vulnerabilities allow the RTF file to automatically download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of 'objupdate' and 'Composite Moniker' firings strongly indicates an exploit chain designed to bypass security measures and achieve remote code execution.
Heuristics 11
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Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE_2017_8570RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
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CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADERRTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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\objupdate activation with payload hidden outside \objdata high RTF_OBJUPDATE_LOOSE_HEX_PAYLOADRTF declares an OLE object with \objupdate (forces automatic activation when the document opens) but has no \objdata destination; the object payload is instead dumped as a large loose hex-encoded region in the document body. This split hides the payload from \objdata-scoped parsers while Word still instantiates the object. Structurally exclusive to weaponised documents.
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body
🗂 Part of campaign:
shared payload 3cd3b7d42e
51 samples
Extracted artifacts 5
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off000451cc.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x451CC | 103011 bytes |
SHA-256: 8900687cc986d5bb83d95d3c3ca79ae5539b5b0941b749b8a6ccc9df70bec10a |
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objdata_01_off0004b97b.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x4B97B | 102984 bytes |
SHA-256: 863e244e4fe1f26822bd1ca2dc514e7eb052751872258df440befb12324a8328 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
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objdata_02_off0007feda.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x7FEDA | 2632 bytes |
SHA-256: 3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b |
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objdata_03_off0008147d.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x8147D | 12297 bytes |
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
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rtf_svb_0000c98b.zip |
rtf-svb-package | RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0xC98B | 2929 bytes |
SHA-256: b968a2cec16a2eccd3aa86666a8f79959f25062cf3ec8dcae40e416083f7cd8a |
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