Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3fc7225e62326a35…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.8 KB Created: 2020-09-03 09:19:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7580f7d2ba31f2c4adae60f6151acd92 SHA-1: 2da32b3c99d77718d2dc89afd4336112988b8567 SHA-256: 3fc7225e62326a3595a07f8b1f4b1f40a78e5ceb40d6b8b99cd6959b281704e8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=font+kaligrafi+bismillah'. This URL is presented within the document body, suggesting a lure to download a font. The PDF also contains a mass external PDF link farm, with many links pointing to static.usrfiles.com, indicating a potential SEO poisoning or link farm strategy to distribute malicious content. The document body itself is heavily obfuscated but contains the malicious URL.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=font+kaligrafi+bismillah
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0d2908_8f1dcb5decc94e29ad8b4e201ce290ff.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_ddbe9f7b9f6d4273aa45a7eb0b4c2d32.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9e56b2ce15c044e99ac8fe15d1b72301.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/af0aa9_09ce394e34824d609d7fdce88d058fd9.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8582/4164/files/7942481159.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7f929b_c3935e360cce44e8a470eee2724b24a9.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_aecdab9270964012a74f003896c4ad80.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b58d21_a54dc69afa31487f9e6a53817abb9acb.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a59130_e3b06a35c4ec445e85b538144176d7d6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/432b07_9ef844282b8a47e5a3832eb75bda5c60.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9f6a24_09ed9737be5e41f4b54142f2d0e064a7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/67f5f7_175dc803176345a69045e3a815753eac.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_006_off000130e4.bin
9d6683a4ad10e9f231723e2d6f5b0c49d6a07232294b1caf9cd60c7ebffc9066
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x130E4 28072 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000f92e.bin
a32d55f4e58cd3b1b0a324f9c9d3a54de76919cef7a7efc956d6f95f857be8da
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF92E 5008 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010a00.bin
3fa5ca6cfedd2252af9abc93d4563fadc0c0f59eec2161060d68fe21e590db94
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10A00 11916 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off000163d5.bin
1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x163D5 4324 bytes