Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3fc0d64505298e97…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.9 KB Created: 2020-08-22 14:26:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6c7c6e20c1e1714a2a622f0056c3a3d3 SHA-1: 8ac481e34fa41878d71766b222ea4e55628d444e SHA-256: 3fc0d64505298e97de567ecfb0276c3ff04b4c69bbbc21ae97fdc183567390e8
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous external links, with one heuristic specifically identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text suggesting it is 'practice answers' and includes the malicious URL. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports a lure-based attack pattern. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=autentico+2+core+practice+answers
    • http://files.christianaharrell.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164462/5051134.pdf
    • http://lisijije.spencersenglishlabs.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813306/lidiwixewaxumabin.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0447/6259/5477/files/solar_panel_types_comparison.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7680/5018/files/kevep.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4964/7261/files/nugejobotekawefetodolager.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8280/0542/files/dasowivuwesoresolefe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/5725/9420/files/8465691018.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5135/1207/files/supuvotakaduxeziwigaluva.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2411/3049/files/dewosugadoviruxitubitak.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/kesazemoluvumexon.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3251/8549/files/rumulenaxepomapikizumoke.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4007/2092/files/84932652417.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1227/5876/files/raxeroki.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000055cc.bin
42414ec96196ec1db8a9e43460e6a49eb747688306a753f324d5cbd00fbf4ee6		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x55CC 5108 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006744.bin
73a6482ba032c7be91bf9113a3a5ad73144e45d88e256a8a5b0e8121b83d5203		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6744 10352 bytes

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