Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3f9ff033ecc9a481…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.2 KB Created: 2021-06-05 04:41:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: d43e5777e10662014bb6201db63123ea SHA-1: c808ed073af4efa936103909b143863b3dab6deb SHA-256: 3f9ff033ecc9a48138199bf7e01cf9b826fc22f28b1b9a0b5f39252a0e7f3a67
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards a malicious document designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://irlanc.ru/pbw?utm_term=how+to+copy+a+drawing PDF link annotation
    • https://lixabexuraluna.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234562/binifiw_mitarotixefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jebezowurexa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134576847/wunabotevure.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feziriwavejoli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096108/5394161.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lepivigodegobuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/7/5/137505729/518f954957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4483602/normal_5febddcb6c2fd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fefosixofenovi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134755919/davaxarumabava.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zefuriduzowav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740504/7b80f8a4c63.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rapafasevujeto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775542/vexerumepi_zolurikulanole_mofabilu_kijaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4504568/normal_600c834fae835.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420430/normal_602ff6137dbe7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://purusoze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134495244/8779733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rubosesizip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134744628/8323097.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xufanipup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856619/1125594.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bazodezivif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136088162/5065615.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4446380/normal_605f88c54079c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/46745ee0-8510-422e-80b4-e70dd9eae2c7/7084502110.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/881181d8-36ee-45fa-8a64-842301e1b43a/jobawu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d9d0dc23-bf64-4144-b6f7-db4162876fb0/mewerurujusudijotixaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e743.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE743 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 4c8e1fa0ff64d1d36598cb8ad4195c1bd561c0d0f9bc3266cb68118babc64ac5
font_01_sfnt_off0000f912.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF912 11080 bytes
SHA-256: 53cd58d04e2bfe34805ba68bc663d02d4677bc306bb1f572ce2b6055c86f6e37

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.