Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3f9f1f9f7da54d10…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

327.9 KB
MD5: beb701c8c9a2a0c6ca4d963ed427de0b SHA-1: 39bdd41af6571e557e212305cf9e708d147e3f40 SHA-256: 3f9f1f9f7da54d10ec218399a2e099dca56961d8c01f52e196d0cfd442c2194d
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating automatic linking and an update trigger for OLE activation. This strongly suggests an attempt to exploit OLE object handling to execute embedded code, a common technique for malware delivery. No specific document body text or scripts were extracted, limiting further analysis of the exact payload or lure.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
fa5d556a8ff1563a208306165176e30d25f4a965b4c7014a349ce30db8e85d30
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 56433 bytes
objdata_01_off00007114.bin
4b120d9efa9d9d75747e22bc95d5eb8daa8c98d8103644b479b74d1ae2d60dab
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114 56406 bytes
objdata_02_off00023c01.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23C01 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off000251a4.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x251A4 12297 bytes